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EDITORIAL

CONSIDERATION of the effects of an international war on European civilization continues to prevent the already long-overdue consideration of a menace that is more certain—namely, depopulation. It is calculated that in 1940 the population of England and Wales will reach a maximum of 40,655,000, and that it will then begin to decrease with a gathering rapidity until, for instance, in 2035 it will be about 4,500,000. This calculation, of course, supposes that trends at present discernible will continue; it cannot take into account unpredictable factors. But that circumstance does not justify us in neglecting its import. The relevant information has been available for some time now, and it is astonishing that responsible people in this country have paid so little attention to it. We are glad to see that the facts have been assembled in concise and provocative form in a pamphlet entitled *Is Civilisation Committing Suicide?* by the Rev. J. V. Langmead Casserley.[1]

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What is the significance of the menace of depopulation? What can we do about the matter? What ought we to do? The issues are complex, and we can mention only a few. A reduction in the size of our population is on many grounds desirable, and it is tempting to dismiss the whole subject with the naive reflection that this will be a much pleasanter country to live in when its population is much smaller. But we must not ignore the conditions in which the reduction will take place, nor the fact that it looks like being a by-product of racial suicide. However, even if the prospect ahead were accepted as inevitable, it would not follow that there was nothing that ought to be done about it. All planning for the future ought to take it into account. What about our industries, our schools, our vast

[1] Church Literature Association, 4d. For fuller information see A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population* (Clarendon Press, 1936).

cities with their expanding social services and their housing estates? What will happen to all these, not to mention other areas of the national life, when the population begins rapidly to shrink? Have those who are responsible for planning on the national scale contemplated the prospect ahead? We have seen little, if any, evidence that they have begun to do so yet. And our bishops, too, would evoke more confidence, when they launch appeals for new churches and for an expansion of the ecclesiastical system, if they made it clear that the needs they design to meet are of a quite temporary character and that their policy is based on a long view.

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Perhaps, however, it is held that the building of new churches will stem the tide of depopulation or at least will ensure that an increasing proportion of children will be born and brought up in Christian homes. But alas! reluctance or refusal to bring up children appears to be as characteristic now of church-people as of any others. Christians, as yet, have shown little resistance to the spiritual disease which has spread over Europe. For we agree with Mr Casserley that the disease is fundamentally a spiritual one. The economic problem, though important, is secondary. "Men are not mere calculating machines. The desire for children has decayed not so much through an inability to pay for them as through a subtle change in the popular conception of what constitutes the good life." This goes to the root of the matter, and it follows that the remedy for the disease is spiritual rather than economic. There is everything to be said on grounds of social justice for a system of family allowances. But the attempt to bribe people into having children meets with only a very limited success; and, even if it were successful, could we be satisfied with a prevention of depopulation which depended on such means? A generation which places the possession of a motor-car and other luxuries higher in the scale of values than the increase of the family is in dire straits. Only a message which touches and changes the moral springs of human living can bring a remedy for such a disease. Those who see that the Christian gospel brings judgment upon the worldly mind and opens the way to its redemption are gravely perplexed

by the absence of any clear challenge both through definite teaching and through exemplary action on the part of the Christian people in regard to this matter.

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No sense of proportion is shown when the debate is concentrated on the question whether the use of contraceptive methods is permissible for Christians in abnormal or hard cases. That is a legitimate, but it is a subordinate inquiry. It is not to be settled either on the facile assumption that with the birth-control movement there has dawned a new era in the progress of the human race nor by the blind prejudice that traditional precept and practice were so satisfactory that there is no just call for a new casuistry. But attention should be concentrated on the natural and supernatural relation between sex and parenthood, and on the purpose of God which is defied and frustrated when parents refuse to " multiply, and replenish the earth." It is only when the vocation to parenthood is seen to be morally obligatory, not an optional but an integral part of the vocation to marriage, that for Christians the subordinate questions arise as to the proper number and spacing of births in the case of any given marriage. And in answering these questions it will be seen that the final criterion must be the purpose of God, not the convenience or pleasure of man.

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A renewed consecration to the parental vocation on the part of Christians would be a much more encouraging and substantial evidence of a spiritual revival within the Church than an increased attendance at religious services. It would also be more costly, and that in more ways than one. Parents, today, can bring up a large family only if they are prepared to renounce luxuries which have become so conventional in their rank of society, whatever it may be, as to be regarded as virtual necessities, and if they are prepared to accept inconveniences and a simpler manner of living which have come to be regarded as virtual impossibilities. For the bourgeois, there is the particular problem of education. It is generally taken for granted that parents ought to be able to give their children as good (*i.e.*, as expensive) an education as they received themselves.

It is easy to understand why this is taken for granted; it is not so easy to see that on Christian premises it ought to be taken for granted. Those who call in question this assumption must be prepared to do some hard thinking, and if they decide on grounds of conscience to defy it they will not expect that their action will be popular with their contemporaries, though their children may rise up and bless them.

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But the difficulties involved in the upbringing and education of children presuppose that the difficulties involved in the bearing and begetting of them have been overcome. The genuine perplexity as to whether it can be right to bring children into a world where battle, murder and sudden death seem to await them is not lightly to be dismissed. There is also evidence that involuntary sterility is considerably on the increase. Nevertheless, when full allowance has been made for these factors, is not the reluctance of women to bear children a grave symptom of our present moral disease?

Mr Casserley writes strongly, but not too strongly, about this and about the vocation to motherhood. Less is said about the reluctance of men to beget children and about the vocation to fatherhood. It would be more than unjust to suggest that in this matter women are more selfish than men; it should also be emphasized that fatherhood has, or rather ought to have, its hardships as well as motherhood. This point is well brought out in another recently published pamphlet, *Fathers of Four* (S.P.C.K., 3d). The suggestion it contains that under existing conditions four is the ideal number of children for a family seems arbitrary and hardly courageous. But it is refreshing to find the vocation to parenthood broached from the point of view of a Christian father. Since we suppose THEOLOGY includes among its readers more men than women, more potential fathers than potential mothers, we commend this aspect of the matter to them. It is obviously impossible to state an ideal number for the family or to generalize about the Christian vocation. The train of reflection which is set in motion by the menace of depopulation reveals in the end the responsibility of personal decision.

Justice and Love

THE antithesis between justice and love, between law and gospel, has always given to Christian ethics their distinctive character, while at the same time it has constituted their fundamental problem. " The idea of justice," says a modern writer, " has never yet been baptized into Christ." But the conclusion of his argument, that for the Christian justice and love are practically the same thing, hardly takes sufficient account of the peculiarity of the Christian religion as a religion of two Testaments, in which the Old, though fulfilled, is never destroyed, nor even completely absorbed, by the New. At any rate the antithesis of which we are speaking must be clearly apprehended as an antithesis, before the true principle of synthesis can be discerned.

The difference between justice and love has been broadly marked by moral theology in its distinction between the cardinal and the theological virtues. The cardinal virtues include, besides justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude; but justice may be taken to represent them all, if it be understood as that principle according to which a man performs the actions which are strictly due towards all persons in all circumstances. The theological virtues are faith, hope, and love. These are the fruits of the new life which comes to man through God's grace in Christ, and they are summed up in love as the essence of that life itself.

The obvious general difference, therefore, between justice and love may be expressed by saying that, whereas justice is a regulative principle, love is creative. That is why justice by itself is inherently defective as a moral ideal. Its defect is precisely that pointed out by St Paul, whether intentionally or not, in his great *obiter dictum* that one would hardly die for a *just* man, though for a *good* man one might, perhaps, even dare to die. In other words, the just life fails to inspire enthusiasm and devotion, because, in being perfectly regulated, it still lacks the essential *élan* and creative quality of life itself. It is like a painting faultless in technique but showing no sign of that imaginative vision without which art is dead.

Because love is creative its actions cannot be prescribed by any code; its outward expression, like itself, is in a true sense " new every morning." But it does not follow that the Christian can afford to direct his conduct by the simple

maxim, *Dilige, et fac quod vis.* He who has no reverence for law and justice, as St Paul so clearly saw, does not know what sin and righteousness mean, and therefore he cannot hear the gospel of God's love. The relations of justice to love are intricate indeed, and we must not allow ourselves simply to cut the knot of their complexity.

There seem, in fact, to be three points of view from which the relation of justice to love can be considered. For the sake of convenience I will designate them respectively as the *practical*, the *metaphysical*, and the *evangelical*, though no doubt such labels are unsatisfactory.

(1) From the practical point of view justice is embodied in the laws and customs of society which impose certain obligations on the individual. Love presupposes the fulfilment of these obligations, but does not suffer the individual to be content with it. It impels him to do more than his bare duty, to " go two miles " with the man who compels him to go one. But if love thus manifests itself in going beyond legal obligation, it presupposes the fulfilment of such obligations as the condition of its own manifestation. From this point of view justice may often appear as a sort of protective fence within which the life of love can be developed, or as a soil out of which it can grow.

The justification for this point of view is well illustrated by the story of an Indian Christian who, being heavily in debt and having unexpectedly received a large legacy, distributed the whole sum to the poor of the neighbourhood, paying nothing to his wealthy creditors and keeping nothing for himself. He overlooked the fact that Christian charity and generosity begin where legal obligation ends, but not before.

The same general relation of justice to love appears in other cases, superficially of a quite different kind, in all of which it seems that love has need of a law of justice, itself quite distinct from love, in order that it may exert its characteristic influence and do its gracious work. Some law of justice, for instance, must first regulate the institution of marriage and the family, if love is ever to make them a true sacrament of a spiritual union and fellowship.

Or, again, consider the part played by Roman law and justice in assisting the spread of the gospel and safeguarding the nascent life of the Christian Church. The author of Acts is eager to show that St Paul the servant of the gospel was also a loyal and dutiful citizen of the Roman Empire,

and that Roman magistrates and governors recognized him to be such, whenever they were not misled by accident or slander. And there is no reason to suppose that the author misrepresents the facts. Roman justice was often brutal in its methods and corrupt in its administration. Yet if it had not on the whole protected the rights and liberties of its subjects against the zeal of a persecuting religion, Jewish bigotry would have made short work of St Paul's mission to the Gentiles. And St Paul was well aware of the debt which Christianity owed to Roman justice. To him its sword was that which restrained the lawless one, and so allowed scope to the gospel to do its work of love beyond law.

At this point a modern contrast may be instructive. The system of justice established by Lenin in Russia has proved itself, we are told, except in the case of political offences, remarkable for humaneness as well as for integrity. But the exception, and what it implies, are most significant. Lenin's justice was proletarian justice, and, as such, avowedly and expressly partisan—a weapon of the class-war. The totalitarian state, whatever its colour, acknowledges no principle of common and impartial "fairness," which binds everyone and every party, both government and subject, alike. In spite of all its faults of cruelty and oppression, and in spite of the iniquitous institution of slavery, the heathen government of Rome did dimly and uncertainly acknowledge such a principle; and therefore on the whole its law protected the infant Church even to the undoing of its own heathenism. But the party-governments of totalitarian states to-day cannot conceive of any justice which is not partisan. And therefore they can see no wrong in persecuting any opponent of the state-religion—whether it be atheism or nationalism —with a refined and scientific ruthlessness compared with which the efforts of the old Cæsars appear bungling and half-hearted.

The contrast shows, in a manner at once instructive and disquieting, how dependent the propagation of the gospel may be on the forcible maintenance of a justice which in itself has no quality of love at all. Gallio's justice was quite untouched by love; but, because it was at least in some measure genuinely and effectively just, it safeguarded the essential rights and liberties of the individual so that the gospel could be preached and heard. On the other hand, the justice established by Lenin was in a sense evangelical—its

fundamental motive was the deliverance of a poor and down-trodden class. But precisely because Communist justice is a mere tool of the Communist gospel, it ceases to be just, and persecutes with every refinement of cruelty those who believe in any other gospel or recognize any other law than its own. Of the three gospels which make a serious claim on the allegiance of men to-day, Christianity alone respects the authority of a law and justice which are in principle something other than mere instruments of its own advancement. It allows rights to non-Christians, because they, too, are men whom God created. It allows authority to the laws and customs of non-Christian societies, because all of them, in however distorted a form, reflect the will of Him who is the author of all moral and social order. Its gospel always presupposes the existence and the validity of a law which is not simply derived from itself. The God who redeems reveals Himself as identical with the God who first created; and the law of justice, however dimly apprehended, is the first universal witness among men to the moral character of their Creator.

(2) But now let us change our point of view to that of metaphysics, and examine the ground of the principle of justice. We shall find that the relative positions of justice and love are changed. This change can be made apparent by several lines of argument.

(*a*) Justice itself is based on the principle that the individual person as such is the subject of rights and the object of duties, or, in other words, that every man must be treated as an end in himself, not as a mere means to an end. This principle in itself contains no appeal to love. But, in fact, it was made explicit only under Christian influence; and, when it is challenged, the Christian is obliged to defend it by an appeal to the priority of God's love. The obligation to treat a man as an end in himself presupposes his capacity for some kind of immortality or eternal life. For if a man's being is merely transient, there can be no reason why he should not be treated simply as a means to the good of others, perhaps of those still unborn, as Communism quite logically asserts that he may. And if a man is indeed capable of eternal life, the Christian metaphysician must find the reason in the fact that God loves him.

(*b*) Again, if we consider justice in its perfection, it seems that it is grounded in a goodness other than itself which the Christian must identify with love. Justice,

when it is not simply concerned with rewards and punishments, deals with the vindication and co-ordination of rights and claims. All rights and claims are rights and claims to something, and clearly that something cannot be bare justice itself—otherwise justice would, as it were, operate *in vacuo* and have no material to work on. I may, of course, say that I am claiming "bare justice," when, in fact, I am claiming £100; but this is only a rhetorical way of asserting that my claim to the £100 is strictly just. Now any good in the world, material or spiritual, may in principle become the object of a claim or right. What goods in particular are the objects of just and vindicable claims or rights is settled in the first instance by the laws and customs of each particular society. But if we think in terms of absolute or perfect justice, we may and must criticize the laws and customs of every society, on the ground that they do not sufficiently recognize and vindicate certain rights and claims which belong to every man as such; and it is evident that these absolute rights and claims can exist only in respect of things which are really and intrinsically good. Clearly, to affirm rights and claims of this kind is to affirm something concerning the fundamental order of the universe. And we shall find in the end that the only way of making this latter affirmation relevant and intelligible is to give it some such form as this, that God wills men's good because He loves them. Thus all intrinsic goods have intelligible unity as being manifold expressions of God's love to man; and man's right to them depends on the fact that God in His love created them for man's use and enjoyment. If we ask, What is intrinsically good? we can only answer, That which expresses love. If we ask, What in the last resort gives a man a right to good? we can only answer, God's love for man.

(*c*) A similar conclusion may be reached by considering justice in relation to unselfishness. No law can be just which is designed to maintain the interests of one section of the community against those of another. It is not difficult to show that all actual laws are in some degree unjust, because in some measure they are the products of the selfishness of class. What, then, could produce a perfectly just law? The only answer is, A will which has no selfish interests, but aims simply at the good of all—and what is that but a will of love? Law and justice can never be the fully characteristic expression of love. Nevertheless, in so far as they are

really just, they must proceed from love as their ultimate ground and justification. They are ultimately justified, because men in their sinful state cannot apprehend the true nature and excellence of love, unless they have first in some measure learned the meaning of responsibility and membership by being subjected to a common and impartial law of just dealing which is laid upon all alike without respect of persons.

From the metaphysical point of view, then, it appears that justice presupposes love, rather than love justice. But this point of view is by no means irreconcilable with the other, which we called "practical." From the "practical" point of view we were examining justice and love in the order in which they are manifested to us, in the order of what is *πρῶτον πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, as Aristotle put it. In this order justice on the whole holds the prior place. From the metaphysical point of view we examine justice and love in the order in which they stand in ultimate being or reality, in the order of what is *πρῶτον φύσει*. And here undoubtedly love comes before justice. From either point of view we may say that the function of justice is to be man's preparatory school for the gospel; the law is the *παιδαγωγός* to bring him to Christ. The Christian will naturally be eager that the *παιδαγωγός* should perform his office well, and for that reason he will always be a social reformer. The fundamental error both of Marxist Communism and of Tolstoyan pacifism, in their different ways, is that they try to dispense with the *παιδαγωγός* altogether. The one seeks to establish the reign of love by fanatical cruelty, the other by idealistic quietism. The religions of both are religions of one Testament.

(3) But there is still a third point of view from which the relation of justice to love may be regarded—that, namely, which we called the "evangelical." Up to now we have considered justice as a principle regulating the relations between man and man; but what of the relation of man to God? Here regulative principles concerning rights and duties are inapplicable. All right is on one side, and all duty on the other. Man, as St Paul argued, can have no rights against his own Creator, who is the sole source and judge of justice itself. And, on the other hand, man's sole and all-inclusive duty to God is complete surrender to His will. Yet, in order that man might attain to eternal life by making that surrender *freely*, he, the finite creature, was

made in God's image, and the possibility of sinning was permitted him. Man has sinned by selfishness until his every act and thought, all his justice and all his love, are tainted by its influence. It would seem, then, that the opportunity of eternal life is lost, and the end of man must be his condemnation. Such might be (as St Paul tried to show) the conclusion of an abstract justice which leaves love out of the account. But to leave out love is "to reckon without the host." For the will and purpose of the Creator, which are the source of all justice, are the will and purpose of love. It is love, not justice, which is creative, and even God's justice has no power or authority against His love. Therefore, according to the Christian gospel, God has found the way of salvation for sinful man through grace. In face of sin, God's creative purpose becomes, without any change in itself, redemptive. God alone can absolutely forgive sin, and He does. But in order that man may be really forgivable, he must first acknowledge the authority of those duties towards God and his neighbour against which he rebels. According to the gospel, the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus accomplish all the conditions necessary to bring man to forgiveness. In Christ man is forgiven by God and brought into fellowship with Himself. The Church, as the fellowship of the forgiven and redeemed, is commissioned to carry the gospel of new life and hope to all mankind.

Thus, in the life of the Church there has come into the world a new order or dispensation of redemption, wherein justice, though it is by no means annulled, is nevertheless transcended and left behind. The Christian forgives his fellow-man as he has himself been forgiven and hopes still to be forgiven by God. The definition of rights and duties appears to be of no final importance. All men are equal, no longer as subjects of rights and objects of duties, but rather as subjects of sin and objects of grace. No one has performed his true duty either to God or to his neighbour. Yet God by his free forgiveness has made self-surrender to His will a joyful possibility for the penitent; and in that self-surrender the service of the neighbour is seen no longer as a duty, but rather as a thank-offering to God. Henceforth the Christian owes nothing to any man save love, and love is the one thing that cannot be rendered as a duty; for if I am conscious that I *ought* to love my neighbour, I thereby acknowledge that I do not. And as for rights, how can any follower of Jesus concern himself with them? To be

saved is to allow love to consign them to oblivion. The handwriting of ordinances, whether it were for us or against us, has been nailed to the Cross.

All this is true, and in the moment of conversion a man may well feel that it is the whole truth. But it is not. It is the truth for a man and for a society just in so far as he or it has been redeemed and is saved by Christ. In so far as the Christian has entered on the new life, the life of the world to come, he cannot concern himself about rights and duties at all; for he dwells in that communion with God where by God's grace they have ceased to exist. Again, in so far as the Christian is the evangelist of the new life to others, he is sent to tell them that the great hindrance to their entering it is covetousness: he is not sent to be a judge or a divider over them. But all this is true of the Christian only in one aspect of his present life. We must not allow St Paul to assure us that the Christian is already redeemed and risen, without allowing him also to warn us that his redemption is still incomplete. The redemption of manhood is complete in Jesus Christ alone. The Christian, though by grace and faith he has already entered into that redemption, still awaits the full *υἱοθεσία*, "which means the redemption of the body."

Thus the fundamental problem is seen to spring from the fact that the Christian is living in two worlds at once. In the height and depth of his spiritual life he dwells where considerations of justice have been left behind, where God's love and forgiveness are everything, and man's passionate cry for his rights has been for ever silenced by the Cross. But meanwhile "in the flesh" the Christian still belongs to this world. He still has a moral struggle to maintain against his lower nature, and he dwells among men who have not yet begun to suspect that redemption is either possible or needed. He must lead them by Christ's power, as he believes that he is still being led himself, towards a full appreciation of God's forgiveness. And as long as that process goes on, the consideration of rights and duties is of vital moment; for it is only through the recognition of the law of justice that the gospel of forgiveness can be heard and understood. The ultimate functions of all law, as St Paul perceived, are to make men aware of sin, and to give them the opportunity of hearing and responding freely to God's word of love.

It is impossible to reconcile entirely the evangelical point

of view with the practical and the metaphysical. But we can at least suggest the line along which reconciliation must be sought by appealing to the dialectical principle which is inherent in all Christian ethics. The end of Christian life in this world is sacrifice, and the life of the world to come is life made one with God through sacrifice achieved. Now sacrifice must be a surrender both of what is really good and of what can be rightfully claimed—rightfully, at least, in respect of the claims of other men. Hence we can see the need that justice should be our first instructor concerning the dignity of human persons, the duties owed to them, the claims they can rightfully make, and the reality of merit and of crime. Only as man learns more and more to reverence justice can he go on to learn, first, that love urges him beyond it to render more than his apparent duty requires; secondly, that God's love is the ground of all justice; thirdly, that in the end God in Christ calls him through repentance to forgo every claim, to refuse all reckoning of comparative merits, to pass beyond justice altogether that he may rely on God's love alone. But this last stage can be attained only by the life already wholly surrendered and sacrificed to God—in its essence it belongs to the world redeemed and made new in Christ, the world to come. In what we have called " the evangelical point of view " God has, as it were, allowed Christians by faith to take a glimpse from a position in which they will be able to stand firmly only when they are finally risen with Christ and have passed beyond this world altogether. The Christian gospel is unashamedly " otherworldly." But it manifests its characteristic otherworldliness not in making men turn their eyes away from this world, but rather in enabling them, even for a moment, to look at it *from above*. And to look at it from above is certainly not to be content to leave it as it is. The love which enables men to reach that point of view is the only really creative and revolutionary power in the world.

It is a disaster that the democratic reformers of the last 150 years should have inscribed " liberty " instead of " justice " upon the banners of their movement. True liberty is found only in the gospel, as St Paul knew well. Apart from the gospel, liberty as a human ideal is a will o' the wisp, leading straight into the bog of individualism, out of which men stumble painfully into the deeper morass of totalitarian oppression. But *justice*, even apart from the gospel, is a genuine light, to follow which is to set foot on

a hard road towards the house of repentance. The Christian opposes the revolutionary movements of to-day only in so far as they contradict that principle of justice for which as the citizen of an earthly state he ought constantly to contend. His assurance in Christ that neither injustice nor justice itself, neither sin nor law, can finally defeat the purpose of God's love does but enable him to contend for justice with faith and hope. In other words, he may bring to the cause of true social progress the religious devotion without which that cause is lost. Justice is good, but it is not a gospel; and therefore few men will die for it unless they see beyond it. On the other hand, many men will die for false gospels which reject the discipline of justice altogether. The gospel which accepts that discipline, while it points beyond it, is the light of the world.

O. C. Quick.

Rome and Biblical Criticism: some Recent Developments

The general attitude taken up by the Roman Catholic Communion towards the main conclusions of the type of biblical criticism characteristic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is well known. After a period of uncertainty during the pontificate of Leo XIII (1878-1903), who for the most part held the reins of discipline with a light hand, there was a decided reaction towards greater "stiffness in refusing" innovations under his successor, Pius X (1903-1914), a policy which, generally speaking, has been maintained ever since. Up to 1903 there had been a tendency to allow Roman Catholic biblical scholars to accept and teach theories of the composition and nature of Scripture derived from Germany and elsewhere, though in fact it was only a small group who availed themselves of the freedom thus tacitly granted. Then came the great change which Duchesne, in a moment of pardonable irritation, is alleged to have referred to as *Le Massacre des Innocents*—a holocaust before which he literally fled into Egypt! The reversal of policy was complex; it was not concerned merely with matters biblical. Moreover, mutterings of the approaching storm had been heard before, even before the death of Leo. As far back as 1893 that Pope had issued the

Encyclical *Providentissimus Deus*, which, though primarily concerned to promote the scientific study of Scripture in seminaries and other places of education, was also a recall to traditional methods of interpretation and affirmed that "inspiration is essentially incompatible with error"—a clear attack upon those Catholic exegetes who were willing to admit the co-existence of inspiration in the Scriptures with definite historical error.[1] Moreover, the "higher criticism," defined as the tendency to "judge of the origin, integrity and authority of each book from internal indications alone," was described as an "inept method," while the teaching that "divine inspiration regards the things of faith and morals, and nothing beyond"—a view which, in restricted form, could claim the great name of Newman[2]—was condemned. Just before his death, too, in 1902, Leo established the Biblical Commission of cardinals and consultors to promote biblical studies and at the same time to secure the observance of the rules laid down in 1893. It was this body which was to be the chief weapon of his successor in combating the new critical method.

An early indication of the attitude to be adopted by the Commission under the ægis of Pius X was given in 1905, when it laid down that the historical books of the Bible narrate objectively true history and not something corresponding to Jewish Midrashim, except in cases—not to be easily assumed—when it might be solidly proved, with the assent of the Church, that the sacred writer did not intend to write true history, but something of a parabolic nature.[3] Though there is nothing here more conservative than the teaching of Leo XIII, and a theoretically wide field is left for midrashic theories, the note of caution is obvious, and it is clear that the views of the Germano-British school of non-Roman critics will not easily be granted liberty among Roman scholars. So, in fact, the event proved. For, from 1906 onwards, the chief conclusions of this school were rejected and proscribed by a series of authoritative judgments of the Commission—*e.g.*, the non-Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch (1906), theories attacking the Johannine authorship and historical character of the Fourth Gospel

[1] An English translation of this Encyclical will be found prefixed to the edition of the revised Douay version of the Bible published by Burns Oates and Washbourne in 1914. [2] See Wilfrid Ward, *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, ii, 502 *ff.* [3] Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, editio 18-20, Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1932, No. 1980.

(1907), the composite authorship of the Book of Isaiah (1908), critical solutions of the Synoptic Problem (1911, 1912), the non-Pauline authorship of Hebrews (1914).[1]

It has commonly been assumed by non-Roman, and in particular by Anglican, students of these matters that this series of decisions, and the practical action taken in accordance with them to control the utterances of biblical scholars, has made the whole matter of scriptural criticism *chose jugée* in the Roman Communion, and that no further development of the matter is to be expected. It is supposed that the Roman Church is irrevocably committed to an attitude of unbending hostility, not merely to particular critical views, but to the whole method of study of the Bible which originally brought such views into existence. This is indeed a not unreasonable conclusion from the apparently final character of most Roman pronouncements, even upon matters not claimed to be *de fide*. Decisions of popes and papal committees are seldom, if ever, rescinded, though they may be allowed to fall into oblivion. Moreover, in this case it was declared by Pius X in 1907 that the responses of the Biblical Commission were binding in conscience upon the faithful in exactly the same way as the decrees of the Roman Congregations approved by the pope upon matters of doctrine (*e.g.*, decrees of the Holy Office).[2] This would seem to give them very high authority indeed, even if they still fall short of the authority of definitions *de fide*.

Yet it seems certain that such a view of the Roman Catholic official attitude towards Scripture is exaggerated. Several considerations point towards this conclusion. First of all it must be observed that, though to the outsider Roman decrees seem to be couched in "great swelling words," they are, in fact, composed in peculiarly exact and narrow legal phraseology, and both are, and are intended to be, interpreted with the utmost rigour. (Especially is this true of restrictive enactments, in regard to which the canonical principle, *Odia restringi, favores convenit ampliari*, applies.[3]) Therefore such documents as the responses of the Biblical Commission must be interpreted with a rigour which is not always understood by those outside the Roman

[1] For the text of these see Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, pp. 563 *ff.*, *passim*. A French translation is given in the book later referred to, *Initiation Biblique*, pp. 335 *ff.* [2] Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, Nos. 2113 and 2114.
[3] *Cf. Codex Iuris Canonici*, Can. 19. *Leges quæ pœnam statuunt, aut liberum iurium exercitium coarctant, . . . strictæ subsunt interpretationi.*

Communion and unfamiliar with its methods.[1] They mean exactly what they say, and no more. Seen in this light, the decisions of the Commission take on a rather different aspect. Very often it will be found, when they are closely examined, that they do not condemn the critical theories they attack nearly so absolutely as might be imagined at first sight. Often they state no more than that the theory is not yet sufficiently proved and must not be treated as though it were. For example, the famous response of the Commission on the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch[2] contents itself with denying that the critical arguments against Mosaic authorship are of such weight as to give a right of positively affirming that the books do not have Moses as their *auctor* and have been put together for the most part from sources (*fontes*) later than the Mosaic age. It then goes on to suggest ways in which Roman Catholic scholars may legitimately meet critical difficulties—*e.g.*, by the theories of "secretaries," of earlier sources made use of by Moses, of post-Mosaic glosses and additions to the text.[3] Yet it does not, as Professor J. Coppens of Louvain has recently pointed out,[4] make these explanations obligatory and refuse to allow any others. Whether this is a satisfactory solution of the Pentateuchal problem or not we are not at the moment concerned to judge. We are merely pointing out that in fact the responses of the Pontifical Commission are, to use Professor Coppens's words, less

[1] To us as members of the Church of England, in which the study and use of canon law is so conspicuous by its absence, such a fact seems particularly strange and is peculiarly liable to misunderstanding. Much of what seems to us an explaining away of the plain wording of some document or decree is really no more than the treating of it in the way it was meant to be treated. It may indeed be questioned whether the Anglican habit of issuing vague and resounding pronouncements, which on close examination are found to be full of pros and cons, and in the last resort to mean anything or nothing, is not more reprehensible than this Roman practice. [2] Denzinger, Nos. 1997 to 2000. *Utrum argumenta a criticis congesta . . . tanti sint ponderis, ut . . . ius tribuant affirmandi, hos libros non Moysen habere auctorem*, etc. [3] *Ibid.*, *Dubia*, ii-iv. [4] J. Coppens, *L'Histoire Critique de l'Ancien Testament*, pub. Casterman, Tournai and Paris, 1938, 15 frs. (A reprint of three articles originally published in the *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* of the Louvain Jesuits, Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 1938. These give a detailed survey, with an exhaustive bibliography, of the history of Old Testament criticism, with a consideration of its recent modifications and a discussion of its relation to present and future Roman Catholic teaching on the subject.) See especially pp. 110 *ff.*

restrictive than hostile critics generally imagine (*plus larges qu'ils ne le pensent généralement*).[1] Space forbids us to examine all the utterances of the Commission in this way, but it may be said in general that only a few (*e.g.*, that on the Fourth Gospel[2]) impose any positive conclusion as certain, and that most content themselves with giving a verdict of "not proven" to critical theories.

Few reasonable men would quarrel with such a verdict in the case of many, if not most, theories of biblical critics. An attitude of final affirmation or denial in such matters is wholly unscientific, and biblical criticism claims to be a science. If so, its theories can claim no greater finality than the hypotheses of, for example, physics and biology, and these, as we know, change constantly as fresh results of observation and experiment accumulate. The scientist who should claim final and absolute authority for his conclusions of the moment would be laughed out of court by his colleagues—especially in these days when we are surrounded by the debris of discarded scientific hypotheses which have given place to others which seem for the moment more satisfactory. Even long-abandoned theories of the past have been known to undergo resuscitation in a modified form to take the place of, or be co-ordinated with, others which once supplanted them. (The corpuscular theory of light is a good example.) The same must be true of biblical criticism, if it is a science.

But it must in honesty be admitted that such has not always been the case. The fault is perhaps less due to the great critics than to their popularizers, but it cannot be denied that there has often been, and to some extent still is, a note of uncritical finality about the way in which conclusions are expressed. Great harm has been done by loose talk of "the assured results of modern criticism," as if any results which depend upon evidence so fragmentary as that supplied by a study of the present contents of the Bible—a text which on the critical presupposition is the result of a long development, the details of which cannot be directly known, but must be inferred from the final result—could ever be "assured." A new papyrus from the sands of Egypt, a new MS from some unexplored library, a new inscription or cult object disinterred by the spades of archæologists—all these are sufficient at any moment

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 112. [2] Denzinger, No. 2110.

to cause us to revise opinions which up till yesterday seemed assured. Such evidence corresponds to the new data constantly supplied by the laboratory to the natural scientist and should make the biblical critic as cautious as the scientist of committing himself irrevocably to any opinion however apparently well grounded. An even closer analogy is the constant progress of secular historical research, which every year accumulates more material than can be easily dealt with by historians to overthrow and revise what was once termed " the verdict of history," and causes one of the best-known historical quarterlies to publish in each issue an " Historical Revision." (It is perhaps the fact that so many biblical students approach their subject through the medium of philological and philosophic disciplines, rather than after a training in historical method, which is the cause of the lack of scientific rigour by which biblical criticism has sometimes been marred. It is a lamentable fact, as the present author has found, that more than one of those who have passed from the School of Modern History at Oxford to that of Theology have had the impression that they were passing to an atmosphere in which the standards held as to what constitutes proof were lower than those to which they were accustomed.) Friends of scientific Bible study may at least be grateful to the Biblical Commission for recalling to the minds of students the lack of finality which must inevitably accompany any type of literary criticism, biblical or otherwise.

This, however, is a digression. We must go on to point out that the strictly limited nature of the decrees of the Commission makes them far less restrictive of the liberty of Roman Catholic scholars than is sometimes imagined. It is not merely that " loopholes " are left for views not wholly in accordance with tradition. There is, as it were, a definite invitation made to those whose task it is to undertake biblical studies to bring forth further evidence in favour of such conclusions (as that certain biblical books are composite) if they can find it. Rome has spoken, but only to declare the case very far from finished. What is forbidden is very much more the treating of certain problems as finally settled than the continuation of research. It is, therefore, a vulgar error to imagine that Roman scholars are precluded from studying critical questions or from making themselves acquainted with the views of those not bound by the enactments of the Roman Biblical Commission. (A

glance at the bibliography of any recent Roman Catholic work on the Bible, or at the review columns of any respectable Roman periodical, is sufficient to dispel this impression.) No doubt scholars of the Roman Church, even such eminent ones as Père Lagrange, have felt hampered in making public their views by the pronouncements of the Commission. But they have not been kept in blinkers; nor have they ceased to study and think. Moreover, as we hope to show, there is recent evidence of a change in the atmosphere of the Biblical Commission itself. We have pointed out that its activities have never been as repressive as certain non-Roman circles (not always disinterested ones) have made out. But there can be no reasonable doubt that in its early days the Commission was dominated by a conservative outlook which was more concerned to stop the spread of views it disliked than to promote and guide scientific study of the biblical documents. In this, it would seem, there has been a change, produced by lapse of time and a clearer apprehension of the issues involved.

Evidence for this is not difficult to adduce. There is not sufficient space at our disposal, even if we were capable of the task, to give anything like an adequate survey of recent Roman Catholic literature upon biblical subjects. But we wish to draw attention to one or two noteworthy publications which have lately appeared and seem of significance.

Pride of place must be given, though, to a verbal utterance because of its exalted source. I am referring to an allocution of the late pope, Pius XI, on May 19, 1938, to the Pontifical Institute of Biblical Studies.[1] This is obviously of the utmost importance, since it represents the mind of a pope who did so much to reform and promote ecclesiastical studies, and since also, in view of the known veneration of the present Holy Father for his predecessor, it may be taken to reflect his views as well. Pius XI in this speech expressed himself as unsatisfied with what had hitherto been done in the matter of biblical studies in his Communion. In spite of the great expansion of the study of biblical languages, archæology and textual criticism since the days of Leo XIII, it would seem that he recognized a gap. "We invite you

[1] I have not been able to obtain the full text of this speech and am dependent upon quotations from it contained in an article entitled *Question biblique* by "Christianus" in the Dominican publication *La Vie Intellectuelle* of January 25, 1939, pp. 162-164. The whole article should be read.

to broaden your ambitions. . . . We have always loved the sciences and always thanked God for them. We have Ourselves tried to accomplish something (in them). But what can one claim to have done, when one compares it with what remains to be done, especially in the matter of biblical studies? . . . *Nil actum si quid agendum. . . .*" Making it clear that he was not speaking of translation merely, the pope complained that in the matter of "criticism properly so called of the sacred text" virtually nothing had been done because so much remained to do. The writer who comments upon this in the pages of *La Vie Intellectuelle* has no doubt as to what he calls this *durus sermo* means. "In the nineteenth century geology, biology, anthropology, pre-history and biblical history have been equally confined by too narrow a conception of inspiration. Thus many of the discoveries of which our age boasts have seemed to be victories gained over the common teaching of the Church." If Catholics had had a better understanding of Scripture this would never have happened. Therefore it behoves them to-day to attack the problem of inspiration, to "discern in the text of the Bible what is religious teaching and what is (merely) the vehicle of this teaching." It is, he points out, a difficult and delicate task, but vitally necessary.

That it is in fact being tackled in the Roman Church is apparent from an important book which appeared early this year, a series of essays by different authors, forming a complete manual of elementary biblical study, under the title of *Initiation Biblique*,[1] the appearance of which was the immediate occasion of the article referred to. That it must be considered authoritative is apparent from the fact that it not merely bears the *imprimatur* of Cardinal Verdier of Paris and a foreword by Cardinal Liénart of Lille, but also two contributions from Cardinal Tisserant, the new President of the Biblical Commission, who collaborated with the editors (p. x). It is impossible to summarize adequately even a small part of what is said in this work of 834 pages, but it should be read by all who wish to see in what way Rome is understanding the Bible to-day. (It is much to be hoped that it will be made available for those who do not read French easily by an English translation.)

[1] Ed. A. Robert and A. Tricot, pub. Desclée, Paris, Tournai and Rome, 90 frs.

Much of it is naturally concerned with the type of prolegomena to be found in all books of this class, biblical geography, theology, customs, etc., and does not differ from what may be found in similar productions of other Communions. It is to the essays on Inspiration (by Professor Pirot, with an important appendix on *L'innerrance et les genres littéraires* by Professor Robert of the *Institut Catholique*) and on the various books of the Bible (by four authors) that the Anglican reader will turn with most interest. And he may be surprised by what he finds there. For example, the definite statement that "from the point of view of inerrancy nothing forbids there being in Scripture parables, allegories, fables, idealizations, legends, or even, as Fr Béa points out, mythical elements, provided that the sacred writer knows and presents them as such, with the intention of making use of them to make us understand and accept teaching otherwise unexceptionable" (p. 25). This principle is carried out in the Old Testament section of the essay devoted to brief introductions to the different books. Thus the possibility of fiction being employed is recognized in the case of the Books of Job (p. 113), Jonah (p. 111), and Tobit (p. 100), and of fictional elements elsewhere, as in Esther (pp. 101-102) and Daniel (p. 109). Critical arguments, whether accepted or not, on such topics as dates and authorship are fairly stated. The aim is always rather to show what views are held by Catholics and non-Catholics than to inculcate any particular view. The whole matter is treated objectively and as one *sub judice*. As is not unnatural, there is a disposition to adhere to tradition more closely in the case of the New Testament than in that of the Old, and here the different points of view are not so clearly stated. But everywhere the book is alive to critical problems.

It has already been pointed out that this last is no new phenomenon. Rome has never closed her eyes, whatever those who would like her to pronounce at once in favour of possibly ephemeral conclusions of the "new criticism" have said. She has exercised her agelong wisdom of waiting to see. That this has been a source of strength as much as of weakness can be seen from a study of Professor Coppens's magisterial survey of the progress of Old Testament studies referred to above in a footnote. He notes with discernment the weak points of the Wellhausen reconstruction of Old Testament history and sees its intimate connexion with the nineteenth-century conception of progress in an immanentist

form. He shows, in his second article, how later progress in the study of anthropology, comparative religion and archæology has modified the Wellhausen presuppositions, and, without maintaining a rigidly traditionalist view, he thinks that the Wellhausen theory of the origin and dates of the Old Testament documents must be modified, too. A study of this most scholarly and interesting work will show how far, and yet how cautiously, Roman Catholic biblical scholarship, under the direction of authority, is willing to go in the direction of admitting biblical criticism.

There is, then, undoubtedly a change in the attitude of Roman authority and of Roman scholarship towards the biblical problem. The attitude of caution and reserve remains—very wisely maintained, we think, in view of the necessarily provisional nature of much that is too hastily accepted in non-Roman circles as final and proved in biblical criticism. But there is a disposition to see that the Faith is not necessarily bound up with a rigid refusal to consider even the possibility of modifying views which have been held in the past as to the nature of the Bible and of its different books, and that, should some of the theories of the critics prove ultimately as near approximations to truth as we can hope to reach in such obscure matters, the Church would lose nothing by accepting them—or rather in sanctioning their propagation, since it would be unwise ever to lend the authority of the Church to the ultimately unprovable conclusions of literary criticism. Above all there is apparent, as a result of the controversies of the last forty years and more, a clearer apprehension of the real meaning of the doctrines of scriptural inspiration and inerrancy.

What is the reason for this change? We think that Dr Coppens provides a clue in the connexion he points out between Wellhausenian orthodoxy and the predominant philosophy of the nineteenth century. Biblical criticism was not a movement of pure scholarship. Few movements are. Bound up with it when it first appeared was the anti-supernaturalist movement which began in the seventeenth century, developed into Encyclopædism and the *Aufklärung*, and ended in nineteenth-century mechanical materialism and immanentism. This was particularly apparent to the Roman Church, where biblical criticism first appeared in close alliance with Modernism, in essence a movement of surrender to the *Zeitgeist*. Whether it was treated wisely or unwisely by authority, the Modernist Movement was

something which had to be dealt with and modified or overcome. The justification of the banning of it which was in fact undertaken must be the flowering of the great movement of integralist Catholicism, theological, philosophical, liturgical and sociological, which is now such a feature of the Roman Church and is apparent outside her borders, too. This would not otherwise have been possible. (Whether the same result could have been achieved by milder treatment of the Modernists is not now under consideration.) It is the defeat and virtual disappearance of the underlying immanentist philosophy which has to a great extent freed biblical criticism *per se* from the suspicion with which it has long been regarded by Rome.

This new situation is full of possibilities and will be closely watched, with sympathy and interest, by many outside the Roman Church. For the story of the relations between Roman authority and biblical studies, which has been briefly and incompletely sketched in this article, is full of lessons, both of encouragement and warning, for all who are concerned in similar questions.

THOMAS M. PARKER.

Poetry and Belief

> " . . . I am shepherd to another man
> And do not shear the fleeces that I graze;
> My master is of churlish disposition
> And little wrecks to find the way to heaven
> By doing deeds of hospitality."

CORIN and Adam are the only two characters in *As You Like It* about whom Shakespeare seems wholly in earnest; and both, significantly, represent the old feudal order, then rapidly disappearing in the face of new economic circumstances. The banished Duke and his followers, even Rosalind and Orlando, though happy enough in the greenwood, are not native there, and it is right that they should return to their social obligations at the end of the play. But in contrast with these migratory courtiers, with Silvius and Phebe, the literary rustics, and even with William and Audrey, whose function is to discredit the pastoral tradition, Corin represents the essential sanity of rural economy. In his encounter with Touchstone it is

the sophisticated court-wit which appears shoddy, in the face of a limited yet profound wisdom which only a working contact with the soil can sustain. Corin is never discredited, and we are surely safe in referring his basic attitudes to Shakespeare himself.

The passage quoted above contains implied criticism of the commercialization of agriculture, as merchant adventurers bought out the impoverished aristocracy and their copy-holding dependents, bringing their own trading methods with them to the country. The reference to heaven and the epithet " churlish " are sufficient indication of the way the moral judgment is expected to fall. The inhospitality of the new landlords was a commonplace of Elizabethan satire, and Shakespeare obviously expresses the conservative attitude of the old-fashioned landed proprietor.

This is a good instance of the way in which a turn of phrase may convert a statement of fact into a judgment of value dependent upon belief. Beliefs of this kind—*i.e.*, beliefs which affect our evaluations, our attitudes of approval or disapproval in concrete situations—weave themselves into the texture of thought and feeling, and emerge, often unconsciously, in a writer's use of words. They may be implicit in his emotional reactions, an individual matter like the pantheistic mysticism of early Wordsworth, or they may derive from a social environment, like the Augustan abhorrence of the Gothic, which infected even the Roman Catholic Alexander Pope in his treatment of the Schoolmen and Erasmus. Or, again, as in the instance we have been considering, they may combine a common attitude with personal experience : Shakespeare's Warwickshire experience gives concreteness to his acceptance of tradition.

It is these implied beliefs which are most important for criticism, far more important than any creed to which a writer may consciously draw attention. For the beliefs which appear in a writer's style are those which have become familiar furniture of his mind, the guiding principles by which he apprehends his universe; whilst a belief consciously exhibited may mean no more than a company promoter's Pleasant Sunday Afternoon. Again, overt beliefs may be accepted or discounted quite readily in the actual process of reading; but the implied beliefs combine with other poetic resources to produce a total response to a poem, which criticism may afterwards sift and explain, but never banish.

It is not, in fact, unusual to find a writer's overt and his

implied beliefs in surprising contrast; for the mind works on several levels, and the levels are not always so intimately related as one would expect. In these instances it is the implied beliefs to which a reader will cling as indicating the poet's genuine, if unconscious, attitudes. Nevertheless, such examples of contradiction between the conscious and the unconscious levels of the mind, if not shattering to our faith in a writer, at least are symptomatic of incoherence in his social environment. They produce in us a disquietude, which we experience, for example, when the Catholic Dryden betrays too close a relation to Lucretius and Hobbes. The Augustans, generally, exemplify this weakness, usually in the contrast between a professed Christianity and the prevalent deistic optimism which alarmingly infects even the most orthodox divines.

Beliefs so basic to a writer as to be interwoven into the texture of his style must necessarily influence greatly the total response which a poem will evoke. But whether we regard this value factor as fundamental or as accidental—an unfortunate condition of the "impure" literary art—will depend upon our view of the function of literature. It will be fundamental only if what we demand of a great work of art be that it should adequately convey to us an integrated, profound response, on the writer's part, to the universe—not necessarily an interpretation, but an organization of thought and feeling, which is felt to be a valuable synthesis of broad and deep experience. And it is at any rate fact that no purely æsthetic emotion has ever been psychologically isolated; and that not only the vulgar, but even eminent literary critics, contemplating a work of literary art, seem to behave as if confronted by a complex of thought and feeling either identical with, or functionally related to, the thoughts and feelings of common life. "Significant form," even in the skilful hands of Mr Clive Bell, dwindles into the most vapidly insignificant poetry; for such an æsthetic a jingle of nonsense syllables would be the *summum bonum*. We must conclude, then, that beliefs, at least in so far as they control a writer's immediate reactions, and so appear in the detail of his style, do in point of fact vitally contribute towards a poem's total effect; and that it is legitimate—indeed necessary—to consider them in estimating the poem's worth, after they have been revealed by the special processes of literary criticism.

Next, as regards the relation of poet and reader: should

conflicting beliefs affect appreciation? According to the philosophy of literature outlined above, I cannot see how such clashes are to be avoided. Those who feel they have attained a " purely artistic standpoint " may find themselves indifferent to the value-content of poetry: the object of their devoted appreciation seems, actually, to be an apotheosis of technique. There are those also who seek from literature only an extension of experience—life, not " criticism of life." According to their theory they have no right to exercise discrimination at all; yet among cultured despisers of criticism, æsthetics, and philosophical dabbling in literature, there is nevertheless a surprising consensus of preference for William Shakespeare over Wilhelmina Stitch.

Coleridge's " willing suspension of disbelief " does nothing to prevent our clash of values, for it operates only when this willing suspension is anticipated by the author. We accept the fairies of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* precisely because we are not expected to accept them too seriously. Diversity of criticism shows that the witches in *Macbeth* are a more difficult problem, but even their acceptance is easier than the acceptance of alien values. We do not—despite Charles Lamb—accept the morality of Restoration Comedy, because it is presented, not as a theatrical convention, but an interpretation of life. It presents vice with a pleasing gloss, distorting actuality to bolster up the insensitive philosophy of a group, and must be " placed " by reference to a wider and deeper experience than it represents.

Dr I. A. Richards' theory of " objectless beliefs " does cover a part of our problem. Dr Richards deals with the special circumstance of the agnostic or atheist in his reactions to poetry which is the product of religious belief. He is himself in the unfortunate position of believing religious values to be important for the proper balance of the human mind, and yet finding himself incapable of belief in the theology upon which they are founded. It should, however, be possible, he thinks, to experience all the psychological accompaniments of belief for the duration of the actual reading, and to return thereafter to the workaday " scientific " world, strengthened and refreshed by the poetic experience, but without any illusions as to the objective validity of its foundations. Self-deception may be the less dangerous for being conscious and limited to a particular function; but mental dichotomy seems a poor basis for the integration of impulses which his critical psychology de-

siderates. And again, while such a feat may be possible to the mind of Dr Richards and others of his generation, the third and fourth generations of unbelievers will surely find increasing difficulty in donning a faith with which they are wholly unfamiliar. A true atheist, with no background of Christianity, would no more induce a conditional faith in Christ than I can a conditional faith in the deities of ancient Greece. This Jekyll-and-Hyde attempt to make the best of two mental worlds is surely unhealthy, and at most can supply only temporary relief from the pressure of an unsolved problem.

Literature, it would appear, is no eirenicon; its ivory tower is not unshaken by the strife of creeds. Reading ability being equal, it would be idle to pretend that a Catholic does not derive more benefit from Dante than a Communist, and a Communist more than a Catholic from Maxim Gorki or John dos Passos. But such differences are relatively slight, for—at any rate in the present age, when, we must remember, Christian values persist, however disguisedly—there is fairly general agreement as to the importance of certain fundamental qualities of mind. Milton's intellect, zeal, and inflexible will are apparent in everything he wrote, and demand our admiration, however some of us may attribute a certain stylistic arterio-sclerosis to his "stern Taskmaster" conception of the Deity. We may deplore Wordsworth's lack of humour and his catechetical attitude towards small children and the lesser celandine; but his profound reflection upon simplicity is ignored only by the immature. The position of Donne is more precarious, because he makes larger demands upon the intellect, but it is interesting to note that that great Christian poet only came into his own in a generation of unbelief. Nevertheless I am convinced that only the Christian can derive from Donne all that his poetry can give.

Now if it be conceded that a writer's style is woven of attitudes derivable from beliefs consciously or unconsciously held, it must be clear that a corpus of belief is necessary for the production of great poetry. The beliefs need not be intellectually apprehended by the writer: they may be general to a social *milieu* with which he is in sympathy and from which he derives them; or they may be personal to himself, yet never brought into clear consciousness, manifesting themselves as prejudice, "instinctive" liking and dislike, etc. Even these latter will be there, as beliefs, for

the critic to discern. Poetry of mood is never so important: the Romantics produced much of it, but it depends upon the reader's mood for its effect. And certain modern poetry demonstrates the fate of complete agnosticism: without beliefs there are no values, without a system of values no ability to select, to sift experience into important and unimportant, significant and insignificant. Expressionist poetry, which professes direct recording of the subconscious and abjures all selection, too often entertains us with dream-fragments of interest only to the psycho-pathologist. Even Realism or Naturalism must select, and the sordid detail of many naturalistic novels is an index more to the writer's mind than to contemporary conditions. Serious pre-occupation with the disgusting betrays the unregulated pessimism into which the optimism of philosophic Naturalism inevitably declines.

Probably the most satisfactory state of affairs is where the poet accepts consciously a body of beliefs already current in the society to which he belongs. On the one hand he has a regulative implement ready fashioned for use, and whose function he appreciates intellectually; and on the other, a prepared audience to whom his language will be familiar. A poet is inevitably aware of his audience to some extent, and a sense of solidarity with it, if he can obtain this without any sacrifice of principle, must be a powerful inducement to artistic creation; while a respected audience may also induce wholesome self-criticism and self-restraint. Conditions were ideal for Dante, and very nearly so for Virgil; while Milton, and Blake even more, are examples of lopsided development—and unfortunate truculence of tone—due to an antagonistic social environment. Shakespeare, involved in the conflict of the Medieval and the Renaissance tempers, allied himself with the old order, and therefore with the majority of his contemporaries. His broad humanity was less fettered to a system, by his avoiding the crotchets of Marlovian revolt.

These historical considerations lead to my final question: Is there historical evidence that changes of belief have reacted favourably or unfavourably on poetry, and can such reactions, if they be shown to have existed, provide data for the evaluation of diverse cultures?

The change which impresses me most in the history of modern poetry, is that about the middle of the seventeenth century: there is no sharp cleavage, of course, but the

usual historical shading of one poetic phase into another. The contrast between Jacobean and Augustan, between late Shakespeare and Donne on the one hand, and Dryden and Pope on the other, is so extreme, however, as to suggest more than ordinary intellectual and social changes in the background. Economic and political changes account for much: before the Great Rebellion our literature was national in scope; afterwards, with the return of an expatriated aristocracy whose doubtful tenure could only breed suspicion, it declined into the literature of a class. And the growth of commercial and industrial enterprise led to a class antagonism, which the feudal order had rarely known: competition replaced subordination.

But behind and beyond these political and economic changes, the influence of philosophical change can be felt more deeply. The medieval world-order was being replaced by the scientific philosophy of the Renaissance. Experimental science, with its limitation of interest to the quantitative, was accompanied by an exaggerated respect for mathematics, and a determined effort to formulate the behaviour of natural phenomena in terms of mathematical precision. Classical atomic theories were revived, a premium was set upon logic, and the Newtonian mechanics seemed a new revelation to a chosen race. It is no exaggeration to say that the eighteenth century faced a new universe. To the Catholic Middle Ages the universal order was pictorially presented: creation, with its central earth; Eden; Bethlehem and Calvary; the session of Christ at the right hand of the Father; our Lady in her cloak of blue, sitting crowned amid the company of heaven, with a burning hell peopled with struggling shapes somewhere beneath. These were the cosmic realities. The eighteenth century looked out upon an ordered dance of atoms, an universal clock wound up by the Creator's hand and left to run down of its own accord; a skeleton universe of naked forces, without sound or colour, for which the indwelling Spirit would be superfluous—a rational order, reflecting the rational philosophy of the Augustan mind:

> " What though no real voice or sound
> Within those radiant orbs be found ?
> In Reason's ear they all rejoice."

The effect of this upon poetry was radical, involving new sanctions, new directions for thought and feeling, even

a new mode of poetic apprehension. To the older poets human action was set against a cosmic order conceived as sympathetic: ethics were founded in metaphysic; the heavens were not indifferent to the war of good and evil:

> " Come, thick night,
> And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell,
> That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
> Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark,
> To cry ' Hold, hold.' "

The Augustan ethic, though rationally founded in supernatural sanctions, lacked this more immediate sense of the universal significance of human action: no portentous convulsions of nature foretold the unnatural death of kings; and for practical purposes ethics shrank to the level of deeply-rooted social convention:

> " He left the name, at which the world grew pale,
> To point a moral, or adorn a tale."

This latter quotation, with its stress upon the verdict of society, is the more interesting as coming from one of the great Christian poets of the eighteenth century.

Change in philosophical background also involved change in the direction of thought and feeling—in subject matter—in, that is, the fields of experience deemed appropriate material for the poetic synthesis. Nothing was alien to the mind of Shakespeare and his contemporaries: all experience was poetic material. This is not only true of themes and characters, but of stylistic detail: the most astonishing collocations are found—*e.g.*, Shakespeare's " Sleep that knits up the ravell'd sleave of care," and " the blanket of the dark," already quoted—at which Dr Johnson found it impossible to restrain his risibility. Marvell at the end of the period provides another interesting example:

> " As lines, so loves oblique
> Themselves may well in every angle greet:
> But ours so truly parallel,
> Though infinite, can never meet."

The Augustans, however, avoided *recherché* simile or metaphor; they restricted their interest to the scope of the coffee-house wit, for whose sake also they banished rugged and inaccessible scenery, in favour of park-land and the town. " Manners " replaced the deeper study of human conduct and its consequences: all must be temperate, in keeping with a philosophy of Reason. This led, in reaction,

to the Romantic exaltation of Nature above man; and the chief interest of Romanticism lies in its frantic search for lost realities, among the gods of Ancient Greece, in the Middle Ages, or among the dalesmen of Cumberland. All their reward was a glimpse of half-truths: only Coleridge, late in life, attained a range of experience parallel to the Jacobeans; but before he attained it he had abandoned poetry, except for an occasional tantalizing stanza.

The acceptance of the new world order emerging from the Renaissance has been shown to have affected values, and the range of relevant experience in poetry. But the fundamental change lies even deeper. It was no less than a change in the mode of poetic apprehension—or apperception—and concomitantly of the status of poetry itself. Mr T. S. Eliot refers to the "sensuous apprehension of thought" as a characteristic of "metaphysical" poetry. Donne uses imagery, not as illustration to the process of thought already otherwise expressed, but as the actual vehicle of his thinking; and the imagery itself is never pictorially detailed, but is rather an abstraction from sense, of those aspects needful for his intellectual construction:

> "Whatever dies, was not mix'd equally;
> If our two loves be one, or thou and I
> Love so alike that none do slacken, none can die."

It is perhaps straining language to call the first line here an image at all, yet as an alchemical generalization it does represent the physical in relation to the spiritual, the lovers' souls. This is a good example of the working of Donne's mind: the image or "conceit" illustrates his metaphysical contention about loving souls; but this is not all, for Donne subsumes chemical substances and souls under one general law—it is the application of analogical reasoning to metaphysics.

The "conceits" of Donne work upon the reader by surprise, whereas the images of Shakespeare are usually woven so closely into the texture of his writing that they are consciously noted only when deliberate attention is directed towards them. Yet Shakespeare's "thought in image" is fundamentally the same as Donne's:

> "To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow,
> Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
> To the last syllable of recorded time;
> And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
> The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!

> Life's but a walking shadow; a poor player,
> That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
> And then is heard no more: it is a tale
> Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
> Signifying nothing."

Image suggests image throughout the speech: "To-morrow"—*i.e.*, time—suggests "pace"—*i.e.*, speed; and "recorded time" refers back to "to-morrow": so does "yesterdays." "Lighted" (light=life) looks forward to "death." "Candle" refers back to "lighted" (and, in the play, to the light Lady Macbeth had always by her, and the taper we see her carrying in the sleep-walking scene, and which is there commented upon). "Shadow" refers back to "candle"; "poor player" to "walking shadow," for the play is a shadow of reality; "hour" is the time-theme again; then "tale," because a play is a tale; and "signifying nothing" is the last comment on "recorded time"; the Recording Angel's work has been futility.

It is a movement of images apparently suggested by one another; but it is not the purposeless succession one finds in expressionist poetry—the unselective stream of the subconscious. The thought is there, and can be paraphrased in abstract terms. And the images are not filled out—they are not pictures, but stark skeletons of experience; only their functional aspect has been realized. They are images used for thinking: metaphor as a mode of apprehension or apperception. Macbeth, a hardened sinner, has lost all faith and hope: he has abandoned belief in survival after death. This is plain from one word in Shakespeare's thinking: "*dusty* death." When "dust" is the important attribute, death ends all.

In the minds of Shakespeare and Donne thought, feeling and perception fuse into one experiential mode: the whole mind is operative at every point. And this surely is related to the background of contemporary thought—to the traditional Christianity which was still valid for all but a very few, and which, even if discarded, would leave habitual modes of thought at first unaltered. Thought in metaphor suggests the system of Catholic dogma—*e.g.*, the session of our Lord at the right hand of the Father. Concrete, image-filled language reflects the colourful universe of Catholic theology, already described: and the metaphysical conceit is above all expressive of the Catholic outlook. Donne compares true lovers to a pair of compasses, and

Marvell's parallel and oblique straight lines have been already cited: "the most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together," says Dr Johnson of the metaphysical conceit. "By violence" is hardly a just criticism of the best of them: and they are no more heterogeneous than God and man, or bread and wine and the Body and Blood of Christ. The emergence of the conceit in the late sixteenth century suggests that the new Renaissance thought had called up the old Catholic mode of thinking into conscious opposition. The conceits were conscious and striking: the familiar had been strained in the tension of opposites. They are the self-assertion of the old order in defiance of the new: quaint, paradoxical thought founded deep in the paradox of Christianity itself.

Even a brief reading in Elizabethan criticism will show that poetry was then regarded as one mode—the highest after religion—of apprehending reality. The poetic imagination could attain the Truth. But the new scientific imagination changed all this. As the seventeenth century advanced, the conceit hardened, grew silly, and vanished. Hobbes and Descartes became the fashion, and Charles II furnished himself a laboratory. Reason they segregated and dignified as the supreme faculty: mathematics was the perfect science, the pattern for all thinking. The new Royal Society insisted on logical clarity of style, free from all ornaments, in the dissertations of its members; and Mr Hobbes referred slightingly to the Imagination as "sense decaying," which is all it could be in his quasi-physiological psychology. And so poetry ceased to be a road to Truth, and poets dared no longer exert their imaginations independently upon the great problems of the universe. They capitulated willingly, because they too participated, often unwittingly, in the thought of the new age. The poetic function was degraded: poetry might still aspire to teach, but it must take its truths from science and philosophy, only dressing them in choice language, smooth numbers, and ornamental references to the classics and other innocuous sources of pleasant imagery. Or poetry, as satire, might enter the political arena, and win itself a ministerial sinecure. Or, again, the drawing-rooms were still available, where something pretty and not too deep might be applauded by "the fair sex." Lastly, with Gray it retreated to the churchyard for solitary musing, *sans* intellectual prestige, *sans* office, not yet *sans* taste, but *sans* almost everything else.

The Romantic Movement was a literary movement with little influence upon the main stream of cultural change: poetry in Tennyson and Arnold cast sidelong glances upon Darwin, and remained discreet; whilst in Browning it implicitly proclaimed its Philistinism, and with the Pre-Raphaelites retired from the world. Attempts to reinstate its independence have met with little success, for the spirit of the new age has revealed itself to be the demon of disintegration; and the brain's right lobe knoweth not how its left lobe thinketh. In an era of specialist activity, how can we hope for that integration of outlook which is the precondition of true poetry? We are left with a paradox: Poetry can be an independent way to the Truth, only when the Truth has already been accepted by the poet and the age for which he writes. Our age is preoccupied with Pilate: "What is Truth?"

S. L. Bethell.

Corporate Worship as the Expression of Community

"What has public worship to do with the problems of the modern world?" The most familiar of the Church's activities is for many people to-day not only the least important, but also the least relevant. The average Englishman considers that the Church has a place in the national life. He may see her task as that of a body of reformers, initiating campaigns against bad housing, unemployment and war; he may agree that she performs a valuable function in helping individuals to integrate their lives; he may believe that religion prevents social unrest and is the bulwark of law and order. What he cannot see is any reason why he should attend public worship.

"Why," he says, "can I not be quite a good Christian without going to church at all? Surely this is an optional extra." If he wishes to be rather nasty he may add that from what he knows of some people who do go to church he prefers to stay away lest he become as they are! I am not, however, merely concerned to justify public worship, or to show that it is part of the duty of the Christian to take part in it: I am further concerned to show that when communal life is healthy it naturally expresses itself in communal

worship, and that the fact that so many people to-day can see no point in public worship is yet another sign of the breakdown of the accepted standards of communal life in this country.

Public worship is the highest form in which the community can express its being, but it becomes unreal and meaningless when there is no longer any true communal life to be expressed. It would appear, therefore, that before public worship can again become a reality the process of rebuilding the community must have at least been begun, in which case the task will be made clearer by true worship, and worship itself will be made truer by the attempt to recreate community in the social life of the nation.

Before the purpose of public worship can be realized it is essential that we should make up our minds about the nature of the Church. " The worship of the Early Church was the common act of the Church of God, as of a body with an organic structure. A congregation now becomes more and more an aggregation of unrelated individuals, met together for a religious service." This is the way in which individualism has expressed itself in corporate worship. The individual no longer thinks of himself as taking part in a corporate act, but rather as an isolated unit performing an individual religious observance. This is true both of the Catholic and the Protestant sections of the Church. " For the Early Church the celebration of the Christian mysteries was a social act, by which the worshippers were brought out of their isolation into fellowship with one another in the Church, which is Christ's Mystical Body " (Hebert, *Liturgy and Society*). St Paul, in writing to the Church in Corinth, begins with these words: " Paul, called to be an apostle of Jesus Christ through the will of God, and Sosthenes our brother, unto the Church of God which is in Corinth, to them that are sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints, with all that in every place call upon the name of Jesus Christ our Lord, both theirs and ours." The New Testament Church recognized its corporate entity in meeting together on the Lord's Day to celebrate the Lord's Supper, an act in which every member of the Christian community took part. Although separated by distance, there was fundamental recognition of the unity of the Body in the one Head. In medieval times the Church departed from this conception, and the mass tended to become increasingly a service performed by the priest in a language not under-

stood by the common people, and in many cases the words of the priest were purposely inaudible. While the service was being performed the people engaged in private devotions, thereby acting not as a corporate body but as a number of isolated individuals. In Protestantism, on the other hand, the tendency was for the eucharist, as the central act of corporate worship, to be replaced by the singing of hymns, public prayer and hortatory sermons. The appeal was to the individual to accept personal salvation, and in Lutheranism especially religion became a personal matter between a man and his Maker. Individualism expresses itself with regard to worship in the expectation of the individual to receive something for his personal wellbeing whenever he attends church. Thus his common criticism of a service is that it was good if he got something out of it, more particularly out of the sermon, or that it was not helpful if the preacher did not happen to satisfy his particular emotional or intellectual difficulty. Few people have any conception of contributing to public worship, or indeed of being part of a corporate unity, offering together their worship and common life to God. For this reason, no doubt, the average Englishman has tended to lay particular emphasis upon the sermon, and to neglect altogether attendance at the communion service, even though he attends, for reasons of respectability and individual moral guidance, the other services of the Church.

The Individual and the Community.—The relation of the individual to the community provides one of the eternal problems in the life of man. One age stresses the claims of the community to the exclusion of any individual rights, another the claims of the individual to the exclusion of those of the community. Thus we move between two extremes: totalitarianism on the one hand, and laissez-faire individualism on the other. The tradition in which we have been brought up, that of liberal capitalism, is based philosophically on the idea that the individual is of infinite worth because he has an immortal soul, whereas the community, being of this world only, exists merely in order to facilitate the development of the individual. The reaction from this disintegrating conception is to be found in the totalitarian systems with their insistence upon the subservience of the individual to the needs of the community. Since they no longer believe in the immortality of the individual, they are right logically in doing this, since quite clearly, if this world

only is important, the community, whether it be nation or race, has a longer life than the individual. Christianity is the only faith which attaches infinite worth both to the community and to the individual. The Church itself is an eternal body, which exists corporately both in heaven and on earth, and it is therefore able to maintain the tension between the individual and the community because both have eternal significance. The doctrine of the Church is an answer, therefore, both to the claims of the totalitarian state and to the inherent selfishness of unchecked individualism.

It is in the light of this that we must look again at corporate worship. The services of the Church are concerned with the great events in the life of the individual—birth, marriage, death—and these are seen in their corporate context, both in terms of human society and in terms of the Universal Church. Baptism signifies the entrance of the child into the family of God, as well as the earthly family into which it is born. Marriage is significant in so far as it symbolizes the mystical union between Christ and His Church. The burial service is the final act of the Church on earth, but is symbolic of the assurance that the Christian has taken his place in the Church beyond the grave. In the same way the regular worship of the Church is to be seen in its social context. "Not only the religious life, but also the individual and social life of the community is re-orientated towards God as its centre and is transformed and sanctified. To worship God in church is not a substitute for the service of God in daily life: rather it is that which makes the service of God possible by bringing the things of daily life into the light of the eternal, and as the Christian redemption is not merely individual but social, so the normal type of Christian worship is not the individual's meditation, but the common worship of the Body when the members are met together to learn the common life which is in Him."

What we are pleading for, therefore, is a re-establishment of the unity of worship and work. The village community of pre-industrial England found the centre of its life in the parish church. The people had a common faith which gave meaning to their individual and social life. The Church was in a real sense the mother of the people. She gave them a common education; she cared for the sick and the poor, their music and their art had reference to their religion, and their holidays were the Holy Days of the Christian year.

This went with the Industrial Revolution and it will not return. Does this mean, therefore, that public worship must be permanently divorced from the life of the community, an occupation for the pious and æsthetic? It will mean this if the Church chooses to abdicate; if she still believes she has a responsibility for the common life it means a new conception of evangelism and of worship.

Connection between Worship and Work.—The root meaning of worship is the attribution of worth: that to which we give worth we in fact worship. The fundamental sin for both the Old and New Testaments is to worship something other than God. It is the sin of idolatry and apostasy. But it is impossible to attribute worth to God on particular times and occasions if during the rest of our lives we worship power, or money, or efficiency, or the state, or any of the other demons which are to-day demanding our allegiance. It is because the organization of society makes the claims of these things so insistent upon us that the connexion between work and worship is obscured and is often thought to be non-existent. Worship loses its reality if it is not a corporate act, and yet the forces at work in our society are so disintegrating that members of the same congregation may be engaged during the week in directly opposing interests and conflicting aims. The class divisions in society are reflected in the Church itself, so that in general the Christian congregations consist of members of the same class of society, and large fields of the common life are almost unrepresented within the Christian Church.

We must notice, in addition to this, that many of the ways in which the influence of the Church was felt in former times, such as those previously mentioned, are now in greater or less degree taken over by the state. The state is forced for its own self-preservation to weld its people into some sort of unity: this means increasing state control over education, the administration of relief, the care of the infirm, and the organization of leisure. We see, in fact, many of the pastoral duties which were formerly done by Christians in their voluntary time now being done by a professional state service. The only way, therefore, in which the Church can influence society in these spheres is by bringing its people to see that it is their task to do this work as paid servants of the state, but also as ministers of the Church.

It is more difficult to see how other spheres of activity, such as those of commerce and industry, can be Christian voca-

tions, and yet this is clearly imperative to counteract the purely mechanical view of man which is held by rival philosophies. The first step towards any solution of this problem must come from those who are themselves engaged in industry and commerce bringing their Christian insights to bear upon their work, but it is possible for them to do this only if they have the support of the committed fellowship of Christian people who have learned the meaning of their task through common worship and study. It may well be that as things are now the tension between worship and work becomes so acute that the individual is forced to choose either to give up his religion or to give up his work, in order to prevent the disintegration of his personality. Mr Maurice Reckitt in his book *Faith and Society* gives one such instance. He describes how the congregation, when faced with the facts of the situation, decided to bear corporately the hardship involved, so that their fellow-member could throw up his employment. To quote Mr Reckitt's own words: "A real sense of corporate responsibility developed in the congregation; in fact, the congregation became a church." Many other instances of corporate action of this kind could be quoted. Sometimes it is a local evil that has to be faced, sometimes the question of befriending refugees, but in each case the essentials are that it should be a corporate act of responsibility which the congregation can offer in worship as a task to which it has set its hand. The fallacy to which Christian congregations are all too prone is that of thinking that the Church's activity ends with the things which happen within the Church's buildings. Thus it is only too common for congregations to make united efforts to build church halls, or to instal new organs, but it is rare that they see their corporate task as something outside the domestic buildings of the Church. They fail to realize, in short, that the Church is in the world not to save itself, but to save the world.

The vision of God and of His purpose for the world which is revealed to the Christian in public worship leads him to be profoundly dissatisfied with things as they are. Some Christians will see their task as that of supporting change through political action, but it does not follow from this that they can find in Christianity one single political program to which all Christians must give their support. To quote Dr Niebuhr, who himself is a Socialist Christian: ". . . We have insisted that we have no right to declare that only socialistic political convictions are compatible with Christian

faith, but that we have both the right and the duty to insist that they are binding upon *us* and that they are organically related to our Christian faith; and that we have the right and the duty to challenge those who do not agree with us to validate their political convictions in the light of *their* faith. The Church must not be a mere forum of diverse political opinions. It is important that those who speak from within the Church should speak in terms of their faith. It is also important that our convictions should not be bound by any official position of the Church, but that they should be bound by a common faith." The worship of the Church enables us to transcend political differences, not by escaping from them, but by believing that, if we sincerely desire to do the will of God in the world, God's power is mediated to us through the means of grace which He has committed to His Church on earth. Worship is adoration issuing in action, and a worshipping community, dedicated to the fulfilment of God's purpose, becomes the means through which that purpose may be realized in the world in all the relationships of human life. The following paragraph from Dr Oldham's chapter in *The Church and its Function in Society* seems to me to sum up the thesis of this article: " In so far as it achieves its true and full purpose, the worship of the Church may be regarded as the most potent and fruitful form of social action. Who can tell what life-giving energies may through it be released, or what hidden secret forces may be set in motion, spreading from person to person and insensibly transforming the thought and spirit of the age? But this can take place, it would seem, only if the connection with actual life is never allowed to be lost; if worship imparts a significance to the daily round; if it consecrates and illuminates with meaning the relations of family and neighbourhood, recreation and friendship, and the various interests of the common life; if those who kneel at the altar are in that act rededicated to the service of God and man and go forth with loins regirt and sword unsheathed to fight in the name of the Lord against all iniquity. To believe that such results as have been suggested can flow from worship, and that they have, in fact, manifested themselves in the course of Christian history, must not lead us to assume that the worship of the Church to-day is active as a mighty leaven in the life of the world. To speak as we have done of the worship of the Church is a call to searching self-examination."

JOHN DREWETT.

The Ecclesiastical Courts "an Ungodly Jumble": Some Suggestions Towards Reform

Prior to the establishment of the Church Assembly in 1920 it had long been a subject of complaint amongst churchmen that Parliament had ceased to concern itself with Church legislation. Notably this was so with reference to the delay in the reform of the ecclesiastical courts, notwithstanding the fact that Royal Commissions in 1883 and 1906 had recommended drastic revision. For thirteen years the Church Assembly has been intermittently debating and reporting without result. The proposals made in 1935 by the Archbishops' Commission on the relations between Church and state have not met with general approval and have been rejected *in toto* by the stauncher evangelicals. It seems, therefore, permissible to put forward some alternative suggestions, more particularly since the recent St Hilary case has brought the subject once more to the attention of considering churchmen.

The field is wide and cumbered with many ancient relics, but we are chiefly concerned with the Report of the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts, 1883; the Report of the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline, 1906; the Church Assembly's Report of 1926; and the Report of the Archbishops' Commission of 1935 already referred to.

The jurisdiction of the High Court of Delegates over ecclesiastical causes was transferred to the Privy Council in 1832 and then to the Judicial Committee in 1833, which has thus for more than a century been the final Court of Appeal. It has been avowed that the transference of ecclesiastical causes to this court was an oversight, but, whether this were so or not, it is difficult to believe that Archbishop Howley and his colleagues would have taken the objections to a mixed tribunal of judges and bishops subsequently entertained by Keble and Pusey. A mixed tribunal constituted in this way satisfies the Church in Ireland, which after disestablishment was free to make its own arrangements, and the combination of lawyers and churchmen is in agreement with the principle of maintaining the union of the lay and clerical elements in the Church. There is no reason, however, why an alternative procedure should not be found which should satisfy all, save maybe the ex-

tremer sections of the high church party, who are the chief objectors to the present system. The root of the objection is a repugnance to the decision of spiritual causes either of doctrine or ritual by secular judges, resulting, as was alleged in Gorham's case, in a modification of Church doctrine under guise of interpreting the existing law.

It would seem that most persons of average British temperament, which is of the pragmatical order, would be content to ask not, " How have the judges been appointed ?" but " How has the court done its work ?" and " Have the decisions on the whole been of advantage to the Church ?" They have certainly resulted in a larger comprehensiveness and in greater freedom for the individual, for as a result of the decisions in the cases of Gorham, Bennett and the contributors to *Essays and Reviews* the position of low, high and broad churchmen has been secured. It is, however, a serious drawback to those who find little wrong with the Privy Council judgments that the costs are enormous and litigation extends over an abnormally lengthy period until the cases arrive at last at a distant settlement. In Hebbert *v.* Purchas, for example, there were five hearings extending over as many years. In Sheppard *v.* Bennett the costs amounted to £5,023 os. 10d., and, to particularize more closely, in the case of Martin *v.* Mackonochie the costs in the Court below amounted to £1,991 4s. 4d. In the Privy Council they were £1,486 11s. 7d. The costs in the same case for obtaining an order to obey the court amounted to £1,459 5s. 3d., and counsel pouched in fees £2,783 11s. In a disciplinary case to which a former Bishop of Lincoln was a party his costs alone were estimated at £7,000. Ecclesiastical lawyers certainly do not provide justice cheaply, and it is surely wrong that right cannot be done without such a vast expenditure. Those who put out suggestions for new courts should make sure that no such costs will be incurred in the future.

The genesis of all the proposals which still engage the attention of churchmen is to be found in Bishop Blomfield's Bill of 1850, by which it was proposed that any exclusively theological point not determined with exactitude in the formularies should be referred to the bench of bishops, whose decision should be binding on the court. To this scheme the Lord Chancellors Brougham and Campbell took strong exception on the ground that such an obligation was inconsistent with the Privy Councillor's oath, which bound

him to advise the Crown in accordance with his own judgment and not with that of other persons. Blomfield's Bill failed, and it is worth while to note that no alterations in the technicalities of legal procedure in these days can be carried without the assent of the judges. Church committees which put forward similar proposals have never assured us that the objection of my Lords Brougham and Campbell are not equally felt by their successors.

Nevertheless, inasmuch as the objections to the Judicial Committee have been so long entertained and are now so widespread, and since its judgments are persistently ignored, it must, we think, be superseded by another final Court of Appeal. The best of the alternative proposals is that the Archbishops should form a panel from amongst those who hold high judicial office and that these should be assisted in cases of doctrine or ritual by assessors, not necessarily bishops. As those who hold the smallest office in the Church are now required to sign a declaration of churchmanship, it is reasonable that the judges should be required to make a similar affirmation. Thus, though the judges will still be appointed by the Crown, those only who have special qualifications will be selected by the Archbishops to determine spiritual causes. This final court should consist of an even number of judges; four, as Paley argued (*Moral and Political Philosophy*, Book VI, Chap. viii), would probably be best, as any decision would then be either unanimous or by a three to one majority. This might cause some little inconvenience in the particular suit, but it is better for the Church as a whole that there should be no unsatisfactory decision with a majority of three to two, as would be the case supposing the court to be composed of five members. The judgment will be binding for the future and delay will do no harm. When the court is divided, two on each side, the judgment would be " not proven " and the clerk acquitted.

We must pass next to the constitution of the inferior courts. These are far too numerous. By the Parish Church Councils (Powers) Measure, 1921, the position of parish clerks was reduced to a tenure of civil contract, and the Parochial Church Council jointly with the incumbent was given the power of appointment and dismissal, thus repealing in effect 7 and 8 Vict., c. 58, which had reduced the jurisdiction of the archdeacons' court, once extensive, to questions relating to the discipline of parish clerks. There is no reason now, therefore, why parish clerks

should have a separate court to themselves, since they have their remedy at common law for wrongful dismissal or other grievances. The 118 archidiaconal courts may therefore be abolished.

Neither is a separate consistory court in each diocese necessary. There are now forty-three courts, and in addition to these there are the two provincial courts presided over by the Dean of the Arches. There was never any reason for setting up the curious hybrid tribunal constituted under the Benefices Act, 1898, the common law courts being adequate for the purposes of the Act. There have been only two or three cases since the establishment of the court. One consistory court in each province is sufficient, and the chancellor would be the official principal of the Archbishop. He would sit in the cathedral city of the diocese where the offence was alleged to have been committed. The faculty jurisdiction so far as it relates to alterations in the fabric or the furniture and ornaments of the interior of the church will be better under the administration of the Advisory Boards now constituted in each diocese. Only when a point of law or fact is in dispute, such as the ownership of a pew or a grave space, should the question be reserved for the chancellor's decision. Marriage licences may be reduced in numbers now that the registrar's office is readily accessible: they may be dealt with by the surrogates subject to the control of the bishop. The provincial chancellor's duties would thus be lightened and he would probably have less work than a county court judge. His salary might be £1,500 a year. If found necessary, a deputy judge might be appointed to hold additional courts as occasion required.

The proposal first put out in the report of the Church Assembly (1926), that the decision of a church court should be binding only on the litigants and form no precedent, is retrograde and contrary to the principles of the common law, which does not allow an inferior court to review its decisions. It should not be pressed, for the more ecclesiastical jurisprudence is brought into line with civil procedure the greater will be the real freedom of the Church and the individual in it. If a judgment offends the conscience of churchmen, there is no difficulty with the present machinery set up by the Enabling Act in amending the law.

Possibilities of appeal are at present too numerous: one appeal is sufficient. This should go from the provincial

chancellor to the final Court of Appeal remodelled as suggested above. The Court of Arches has done very little business for many years, and venerable as it is may be abolished.

The Dean of the Arches is also the judge under the Public Worship Regulation Act and Master of the Court of Faculties —a judicial pluralist. Since the court under the Act of 1874, formerly called after the name of Lord Penzance, has done no business for sixty years it would seem that the office is a sinecure. The repeal of this Act was recommended by the Royal Commission of 1906. It pleased Parliament by the Ecclesiastical Fees Act, 1875, 38 and 39 Vict., c. 76, to appropriate " the sum of eleven hundred and twelve pounds eighteen shillings and one penny or thereabouts " for the maintenance of the judge from the revenues of Queen Anne's Bounty Board, established by Letters Patent of that sovereign " for the augmentation of the poor clergy." The expenses incurred by bishops in the exercise of disciplinary proceedings are now defrayed from the common fund of the Ecclesiastical Commission—an improper use of the fund comparable with seething the kid in his mother's milk, since the sum available for the augmentation of poorer benefices is thereby diminished. The judge, it appears, is now paid from the fees of the Faculty Office, though, as he does no work, presumably there are no fees. Certainly he does nothing, in Mr Disraeli's phrase, " to put down ritualism." In any case the payment of judges by fees is objectionable.

Notwithstanding Royal Commissions and Church Committees, remarkably little information has been forthcoming concerning the mysterious activities of the Primate's legal officials in Knightrider Street. No statement of accounts, report or balance sheet is issued by the Faculty Office, and it would be well if His Grace were to give instructions that this should be done.

The Court of Faculties concerns itself with the business of issuing marriage licences, both " ordinary " and " special "; with the preparation of the necessary legal instruments when the Archbishop confers Lambeth degrees in divinity or music, and the admission and control of Notaries Public. The powers of the Archbishop of Canterbury to issue special marriage licences and to confer degrees should certainly be retained, but these need no special court and the business may quite conveniently be carried

out by the legal officials of the diocese of Canterbury. It was part of Grindal's suggested reform of the Faculty Court (then the " special nursery of dishonesty," to quote Froude) that marriage licences should disappear, and this reform was approved by the Council, but went no further. Marriages by licence, either special or ordinary, are unknown in Scotland, and now that facilities exist at the registry offices ordinary licences might with advantage be discontinued in England.

There remains the question of the licensing of Notaries Public, of whom there are now about 560. The office dates from the civil institutions of ancient Rome: when it was first introduced into this country is uncertain. The common saying, " The seal of a notary runs through Christendom," is a sufficient indication of the papal origin of the office and its connexion with the canon law; many notaries were doubtless " clerks." The power of appointing notaries, delegated by the pope to the Archbishop of Canterbury prior to the Reformation, was by the statute 25 Henry VIII, c. 21, " The Act concerning Peter-Pence and Dispensations," assumed by the King and the Court of Faculties was created, to which the appointment of notaries was assigned and still belongs.

It appears an anachronism in these days that the archbishop should have the duty of licensing and controlling a special class of attorneys whose duties, once ecclesiastical, are now almost entirely of a civil character. When the corporation of civilians and canon lawyers known as Doctors Commons was dissolved in 1857, proctors and advocates abolished, and the ecclesiastical courts opened to the whole bar, it would have been well if the office of Public Notary had also been determined. In Scotland the appointment of notaries rests with the Court of Session. In Ireland the Archbishop of Armagh long exercised the power of granting the faculties, but by the Act of 1870 it was taken from him and vested in the Lord Chancellor of Ireland until the year 1922, when the office of Lord Chancellor was abolished. In Wales, under the Welsh Church Act of 1914, the appointment of notaries made under the Act 3 and 4 William IV, c. 70, was vested in the Lord Chancellor, though the appointment made under other Acts still rests with the Archbishop of Canterbury. In France notaries are appointed by decree of the President of the Republic. There is no appeal from the decision of the

Master of the Faculties; but if he exercises his power otherwise than in a judicial manner, complaint may be made to the Lord Chancellor, and the archbishop may be mulct in penalties specified in the chancellor's writ. Notaries are now for the most part solicitors, and the faculty must be registered and subscribed by the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery. It is suggested that this special class of attorney, if it is still deemed to serve any purpose of public utility, may be handed over to the Master of the Rolls and the Law Society, who exercise control over solicitors. We have long, however, been of opinion that their duties may equally well be discharged by any duly qualified solicitors, though these might be required to learn a little more French. Bills of exchange and mercantile matters are the usual concern of the notary, and he may also be called upon to authenticate and certify documents. But the notary " public," despite his name, is not recognized by our courts as a public officer to the same degree as he is in foreign countries. The Archbishop of Canterbury has long ceased to confer medical degrees, and it seems an anomaly that he should continue to examine and admit lawyers. The Lambeth degrees in medicine were virtually abolished by the statute 21 and 22 Vict., c. 90, which enacted that the holders of the degrees should not thereby be entitled to practise medicine. The Court of Audience and the Court of Peculiars have fallen into desuetude: the Court of Faculties may also be allowed to lapse.

The total amount in fees paid by notaries on their admission is about £50. How much of this may find its way into the revenues of the archbishop after stamp duties and the costs of legal officials have been defrayed is mysterious, but if the reforms here advocated entail any diminution in the income of the primate, the loss must be made good from the general revenues of the Church.

The changes here proposed are no doubt far-reaching; but not more so than those made in the civil law under the Judicature Acts of the seventies, when the fusion of law and equity was accompanied by the abolition of such ancient tribunals as the Exchequer and Common Pleas, to the public advantage. A like reform in the Courts Christian would lead to an equally desirable result in the sphere of ecclesiastical jurisprudence and would make an end of what Cromwell called " an ungodly jumble."

" Cineas."

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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" Cineas " is the *nom de plume* of a lay member of the Church of England.

The Rev. H. L. Hubbard is Vicar of All Saints' Church, Margate, and Hon. Canon of Canterbury Cathedral.

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NOTES

FALSE GODS: A BIBLICAL REVERIE

Two books of the Bible are given back to us by contemporary events, palpitating with vivid reality—Daniel and the Apocalypse. Daniel comes to us from the heart of the Maccabæan struggle, when the idea of martyrdom in its historic sense was first formed, witness, unto death if necessary, for spiritual convictions against the state which for the first time insisted on uniformity (1 Macc. i, 41: " King Antiochus wrote to his whole kingdom, that all should be one people, and that each should forsake his own laws "). The Apocalypse uses traditional material to explain the crisis which beset the growing Church confronted with state-worship.

The driving power of both books is immensely enhanced by their use of concrete images to express spiritual realities. In Daniel x the hosts of the Lord, which were formerly thought of as encompassing Israel, have become Michael the prince, who is a kind of tutelary spirit of the Jews. He contends with the tutelary spirits of the Persians and the Greeks (verses 13, 20). The parts played by Michael in the spiritual warfare of the Apocalypse, and by the Beast, are too familiar to need more than allusion.

St Paul's teaching, too, is well known. " Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world-rulers of this darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in ' the heavenlies ' " (Eph. vi, 12). But these " powers " are not entirely evil; they are appar-

ently open to conviction: " that now unto the principalities and the powers in ' the heavenlies ' might be made known through the church the manifold wisdom of God " (Eph. iii, 10). In 1 Cor. viii the Apostle seems to say that an idol is nothing. God is one, but spiritual beings exist with a certain potency of their own: " there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth; as there are gods many and lords many " (ver. 5).

The New Testament has become intensely topical. Is it too much to suggest that its language is symbolic in the sense that a symbol really is what it represents? That the false gods of to-day owe their power to the fact that they are realities and not mere abstractions?

If such a thought is possible to us at all, we shall visualize the nation-state which demands the complete allegiance of conscience as an emanation from the minds of the dominant individuals within the nation, as possessing a quasi-personal reality of its own. This " corporate " personality exists in the heavenlies—that is, in the non-material sphere. Worship is paid to it as to a false god. The emergent God of certain philosophers is not God at all, as Christians understand the word. But that " gods " should emerge is a quite intelligible idea.

Certain consequences follow. Such gods have a real, though temporary, existence. They are allowed by God, who, however, always has the situation in hand, and Himself remains eternally. They cannot be thwarted by material means. They are not wholly evil, any more than the men are to whom they owe their existence; as St Paul teaches, they may learn through the Church the manifold wisdom of God.

Let the reader, if he will, draw conclusions as to Christian foreign policy. The purpose of this note is to recall him to a deeper study of the Bible. Let us never forget that the Old Testament gives us the last word of assurance and comfort. A great host compasses the city. " Alas, my master ! how shall we do?" says Elisha's servant. " Fear not," says the prophet: " they that be with us are more than they that be with them." The eyes of the young man are opened and he sees " the mountain full of horses and chariots of fire round about Elisha " (2 Kings vi, 15-17).

W. K. L. C.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE CONDITIONS FOR A JUST WAR

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

In view of the importance of Mr C. S. Lewis's letter in your May number on " The Conditions for a Just War " I hope a few additional comments to Fr Mascall's excellent reply will not seem redundant.

(1) Mr Lewis rightly observes that the individual's conscience is not reliable enough to be the sole or even the main criterion of the "justice" or otherwise of a particular war, and that his conscience is bound to be to some extent "delegated." But Mr Lewis then proceeds to make a distinction between the moral decision about murdering prisoners or bombing civilians and the moral decision about the justice of a given war. The state does not, however, allow of such a distinction, so that the distinction must proceed from Mr Lewis's own individual and undelegated conscience. What if my, or someone else's, individual and undelegated conscience starts making distinctions earlier?

(2) Mr Lewis, reasonably, wants a clear Christian witness. That is, he wants, presumably, the most effective witness. Of course in the act of witness the Christian must not consider what is most effective but what is true. But let us consider it pragmatically for a moment. Assuming in advance that any conceivable war to-day is, by an overwhelming probability, bound to include at any rate the bombing of civilians, might it not be more effective if Christians were to make their moral decision beforehand—*i.e.*, at a time when it might be still possible to influence the policy of a government? (It is, by the way, precisely this up-to-the-last-minute possibility of influence that Conscription precludes.)

(3) The very fact that Mr Lewis has found it imperative to raise this "very dark" question is evidence that we are in new circumstances where former decisions do not fit, as Fr Austin Farrer happens to suggest in his article in the same number. At such times in history the burden that falls on the individual prophetic conscience is most perilous, yet at the same time most precious. And at such times of flux there has never been "a clear Christian witness," if only because it has to be left to subsequent history to show, between many claimants, where the "Christian witness" lay. This is unfortunate, for we seem to be left only with Fr Mascall's "witness of charity and fortitude." But is Mr Lewis's own "clear issue" really much clearer?

Yours faithfully,
W. R. Jarrett-Kerr.

31, Cambridge Road,
Thornaby-on-Tees,
Yorks.
June 3, 1939.

P.S.—Doubtless both contributors realize the danger of isolating the problem of the "just war" (viz., as something to be adjusted to the individual conscience) from the socio-economic situation in which the problem arises and from which it derives its peculiar acuteness. For those who have not read it Mr Maurice Reckitt's *Religion in Social Action* (Centenary Press, 3s. 6d.) may be recommended: he devotes a large section to this

very problem and puts it in its wider sociological setting, in which neither "pacifism" nor "chivalry" is shown as contributing the ultimate solution. Of course, Mr Lewis and Fr Mascall were concerned with a particular limited issue; but the general *sitz im leben* should not be forgotten.

THE GENERAL SYNOD OF THE CHURCH OF IRELAND

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

In the course of my "Survey of the General Synod of the Church of Ireland" in your June issue, I made a slight mistake in a reference to one of the bills introduced at the Synod. The bill, "to amend chapters i, ii, iii, iv, and v of the Constitution of the Church of Ireland," *did* appear on one of the orders of the day. Furthermore it passed its first reading, but the promoters of the bill, in view of the length of this year's General Synod proceedings, themselves asked that the second reading be postponed until 1940, and the Lord Primate expressed his thanks to them for their unselfish action.

I shall be very much pleased if you can print this explanation in the next issue of THEOLOGY.

Yours, etc.,
R. R. HARTFORD.

39, TRINITY COLLEGE,
DUBLIN.
June 7, 1939.

COMMENT ON PERIODICALS

(*a*) THEOLOGICAL

"THE central tragedy of the modern world," says Mr Brian Wormald in *The Cicestrian*[1] (Lent Term), "is the antagonism between Catholics and Socialists" and asks whether no collaboration is possible for the needs of the modern situation. Questions of Christian sociology are, indeed, very much to the fore, especially in Roman Catholic periodicals. In *The Clergy Review*[2] (May) Michael de la Bedoyère considers the natural law of the family, which the Church should uphold against the challenge of the two forces of liberal philosophy and anti-liberal social theory. In the same number there is a defence of the orthodoxy of Beethoven's Missa Solemnis. *Etudes*[3] (April 5 and 20) contain

[1] Chichester Theological College. [2] Burns Oates and Washbourne. [3] Paris: 15, Rue Monsieur.

articles addressed to parents by Jean Rimaud concerning "Education et Direction": "All true education is direction of the growth of the child in a way determined by its vocation. . . . The growth of the child towards the autonomy of the man presents the problem of an effort on which depends the child's whole progress, psychological and moral. Direction properly conceived is the art of helping the child . . . to choose this effort and to accomplish it." In the same strain the article entitled "Puero Reverentia" in *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*[1] (April) deals with the sexual education of the young. Professor J. M. Creed contributes an interesting defence of the idea of a national church to the *Modern Churchman*[2] (April), in the shape of a university sermon, preached both at Oxford and at Cambridge. And Dr Maude Royden writes in *The Expository Times*[3] (May) on "The Ministry of Women": "No one yet knows all they can give, for they have never had this freedom to give and to be themselves. It is necessary for the well-being of the Church of Christ that they should now have it and have it equipped with all that the finest education and the truest scholarship can give them." To the same number Principal W. F. Lofthouse contributes a useful consideration of the meaning of the Righteousness of Jahveh. *Irénikon*[4] (January-February) contains an article by Madame Lot-Borodine on "The Theocentric Anthropology of the Christian East as the Basis of its Spiritual Experience"—the "exhaustive doctrine of contemplation-union which is close to and at the same time essentially different from neo-platonic thought." *The Ashram Review*[5] (April) has a summary of an article by the same authoress, "in which she seeks to prove that there is lack of support for the doctrine of the Dark Night in the Early Fathers of the Church." *Irénikon* also contains an article on "The Creed of Léon Chestov," "a searching analysis of whose genius cannot fully penetrate the intimacy of his thought and of his soul." And the "Chronique Religieuse" of the same number is full of interesting facts, more especially about religious conditions in Russia and Greece and many interconfessional activities.

F. B. Welbourn.

(*b*) Literary

Outside the Church there is still a certain reaching after orthodoxy, especially the dogma of original sin. It turns up once or twice in the spring number of *The Southern Review*,[6] a sort of American counterpart of *Scrutiny*. And that not only where one would expect it, in an article, "Notes on *Ash Wednesday*," by

[1] Paris: Maison Casterman, Rue Bonaparte, 66. [2] Blackwell. [3] T. and T. Clark. [4] Prieuré d'Amay-sur-Meuse, Belgium. [5] Christa Prema Seva Sangha, Poona 5, India. [6] Louisiana State University Press. Quarterly, 3s. 6d. From Gordon Frazer, Cambridge.

Leonard Unger (a helpful piece of " source criticism "), but also in " Thomas Mann and Universal Culture " by Harry Slochower, and in a " Grand Tour of Fiction " by Howard Baker. True, Mr Slochower makes some curious statements. " Mann's work has Catholic character. But it is Catholic with a difference. It does not recreate the Thomistic unity T. S. Eliot calls for." (Where does Eliot call for that ?) " At a time when our scene is split by masochistic cries, secular crucifixions, by transitional styles and surprise techniques on the one hand, and admonitions towards frozen Absolutes on the other, Thomas Mann continues the sober idiom that characterizes the great heritage of the West." There is admittedly a kind of Catholic apologetic to-day that can be called an " admonition towards frozen Absolutes," but it is not the kind Mr Eliot is interested in; and really " frozen Absolutes " is more accurate as a description of the doctrinaire Marxism which Mann is here congratulated for approaching. Mr Howard Baker is also Marxist in approach, but his critical standards are excellent; and he allows that the strength of Allen Tate's novel *The Fathers* comes from the fact that it " seems to be rooted in the religious view of the innate evil of man," and contrasts it favourably with another American novel, *The Liberals*, by John Hyde Preston, which he admits " seems to be generated out of a practical Marxism." This American review is worth watching. Mr Rayner Heppenstall is also busy with orthodoxy in the June *Purpose*.[1] In a study of William Blake he discusses the two main heresies in the history of Western Europe, the Manichæan heresy and the Utopian heresy. (He does not use the word " Pelagian.") Blake started off as the " earliest full-blown Utopian," but grew out of it. What he grew into we shall see in the second part or Mr Heppenstall's essay, to be published in the September number. Meanwhile this number further bows to orthodoxy by inviting a member of an Anglican religious community to contribute the " Symposium ": Brother George Every, S.S.M., writes on " The Task of Concentration," and does not conceal the premises from which he starts, premises which are so well able to supply what in the modern mood we are chiefly asking for, " for rhythm, for ritual, for a restored regularity in our common life." The writer will need no recommendation to readers of THEOLOGY. Germane to his theme is a useful paper in the March *Christendom*,[2] on " The Catholic Family: A Sociological Approach," by J. F. Fletcher, S.T.D., of the American Episcopal Church. But more important, and still within the same ambit of ideas, are Mr T. S. Eliot's " Commentaries," which since the demise of the *Criterion* he has resumed in the *New English Weekly*.[3] In the first of these, " That Poetry is made

[1] The C. W. Daniel Co., Ltd., 40, Great Russell Street, W.C. 1. Quarterly, 1s. [2] Blackwell, Oxford. Quarterly, 2s. [3] 7 and 8, Rolls Passage, E.C. 4. Weekly, 6d.

with Words " (April 27), he hinted that most problems to-day come back to the problem of education. This was followed (May 11) by a critique of the Spens Report on Secondary School Education, where he chases the problem further back still. The ultimate effect of such Reports by Commissions, he says, " will be contingent upon the philosophy of life that is tacitly and largely unconsciously accepted by the men and women who have to carry them out," which is in effect nil. " The acceptance of either a Christian or a secularist philosophy would render this—or any report that could be written to-day—obsolete." As Miss Maud Bodkin puts it in the May *Adelphi*,[1] reviewing Eliot's play, " The Family Reunion " (the most sensitive and sensible review I have seen published): " Our trouble is both within us and without. . . . We have to seek knowledge of the sin—in ourselves and in our world—that now is fulfilling itself in such monstrous shape."

W. R. Jarrett-Kerr.

MURAL PAINTING

An exhibition of the photographs of mural paintings, made in Great Britain during the last twenty years, was held last month in the Tate Gallery.

Although it is difficult to judge from photographs, the work of Stanley Spencer and of Augustus John seems to stand out from the rest. The former's war memorial paintings in the Oratory of All Souls, Burghclere, with their humorously intimate and yet passionate studies of the soldier's death and life, make a worthy addition to the great frescoes which the Church has inherited from the past. Of the other numerous church decorations, Hans Feibusch's vigorously designed " Christ Washing the Disciples' Feet," at Collier's Wood Methodist Church, needs special mention.

Fresco painting has its origin, growth and finest achievements in the Church of the past; the future promises a revival of mural painting, but it will need patronage and stimulus, and this is something which the modern Church can give. A " Society of Mural Painters " has recently been formed, which is anxious to facilitate such collaboration between artists and, for instance, clergy who are responsible for church buildings. Its offices are at 32, St James's Street, London, S.W. 1, where any advice, and also collections of drawings and photographs of the members' work, are available to anyone who may be interested in commissioning mural painters.

G. N. Walton.

[1] 12, Woodside, Erskine Hill, N.W. 11. Monthly, 6d.

SURVEYS

(A) RECENT DEVOTIONAL LITERATURE

One of the most remarkable signs of a revival of the spiritual life in England is the stream of devotional literature which emanates from the publishers to-day. It would be idle to pretend that all these books are alike good; some indeed are very poor and thin in substance, and of others the reader is left to wonder why they were written at all. But the fact remains that they are symptomatic of a new interest in the things of the spirit which is manifesting itself amongst us to-day.

The writer has before him some two dozen books which have all been published in the last half-year, and this article is an attempt to estimate their value both separately and together. In order to do this he has divided them into five groups as follows: (1) Ascetic theology and prayer; (2) books for use in meditation; (3) sermons and spiritual reading; (4) devotional commentaries on books of the Bible; and (5) a group of books which fit into none of the previous categories.

(1) Ascetic Theology and Prayer

Ascetic theology must have its foundations rooted deep in Christian doctrine. To divorce the creed from the life of prayer is to invite disaster, leading easily to the errors and dangers of an individualistic spirituality. How dangerous this can be is evidenced by the tragic picture of a divided Christendom. A strong, sane devotional life can be built only upon a firm grasp of the Catholic Faith. *The Faith that Abides*, by F. P. Harton (C.L.A., 1s.), recalls us to this foundation. It consists of a simple treatment of the great truths of Christianity and is a little book which should make a wide appeal by its clear statement of Catholic doctrine.

Dr Hubert Box has written in *Spiritual Exercises* (S.P.C.K., 3s. 6d.) an excellent little handbook for directors of souls. In it he deals not only with the various degrees of prayer, but also with such exercises as are connected with the sacramental life. His book is based on the works of the great masters of the spiritual life, chiefly Scaramelli, supplemented by Faber. From the same author comes *An Introduction to the Ignatian Exercises* (S.P.C.K., 3s. 6d.), intended primarily for the use of retreat conductors. Priests who are engaged in this responsible work are probably familiar with the Exercises from the English editions by Fathers Rickaby and Longridge. This book does not claim to take the place of, but to lead up to, this fuller knowledge. As such it should certainly serve a useful purpose, but the reader must not

expect to find the Exercises anglicized in any way. Such a task, should they desire to undertake it, is left to their own efforts.

Father Bede Frost's new book, *Prayer for all Christians* (Mowbray, 2s.), contains the substance of a course of Lent sermons preached in a London church. Here we find Fr Bede the preacher—simple, direct, colloquial. He tells ordinary folk just what they want to know about their prayers, and answers their difficulties. His profound scholarship is there, but it does not obtrude itself. His wide reading and deep experience are translated into a language " understanded of the people." *O si sic omnes!*

Another valuable book for the parish priest who tries to teach his people, both young and old, how to pray is *Training in Prayer* (Rich and Cowan, 3s. 6d.). This is the work of six contributors and is edited by Canon Lindsay Dewar. The teaching given is based both on the traditional Catholic doctrine of prayer and modern educational methods. It is this kind of book which helps the priest to help his people. Of another kind is *The Living Prayer*, by A. L. Watson (Mowbray, 2s.). This is a little treatise on the Paternoster in which the author seeks to discover the meaning of the words as living, personal experience. He contends that the whole of the Faith lies behind them, and that God's plan of salvation is summed up in them. It is a little book which suggests a good deal more than it actually says.

Two other books belong to this first section. If we do no more than indicate their contents it is not to suggest that they are not of interest or value. Quite the contrary; and many of our readers will delight in them. They are *Life unto God* (S.P.C.K., 5s. net) —a small book of reflections on the spiritual life by E. R. A. Kermack; and *Eucharistic Prayers from the Ancient Liturgies*, collected and arranged by Miss Evelyn Underhill (Longmans, 2s. 6d.).

(2) Books for Use in Meditation

In times of spiritual dryness many of us are helped by the use of a book of outlines for our meditations. This is not a practice which should be over-indulged, but as an occasional help it is of very great value. In *Daily Meditations on the Lenten Epistles*, by H. G. Pigott (C.L.A., 1s.), the method of a simple three-point meditation is employed, prefaced by a reading of the Epistle, and finishing with a simple resolution and a prayer. *The Passion of Christ*, by Charles Williams (Oxford University Press, 3s. 6d.), follows a different method. It gives the narrative of the Passion accompanied by comments from great teachers and saints. It presupposes a more intellectual type of meditation, and one in which the exercitant will find himself called upon to do more for himself.

Two recent publications from the Student Christian Movement Press deserve attention as providing material for meditation.

The first is *Meditations on the Cross* (2s.), by Toyohiko Kagawa. In this book the author, perhaps the greatest spiritual power in Japan to-day, provides a number of short chapters on different aspects of the Cross. It is a book to be read and used with care, since the author is somewhat of a free lance in the realms of Christian theology. Nevertheless it is extremely vivid, suggestive and stimulating, and a book which for its reading belongs properly to the time of prayer.

Behold thy King (4s.) is by Suzanne de Dietrich, a Frenchwoman who holds office in the World's Student Christian Federation. It is a somewhat unusual book both in form and substance. At first sight it appears to emphasize the divinity of Christ at the expense of His manhood; but it is the manhood as the gateway to the realization of the divinity that the author is trying to stress in these helpful meditations. (It is well to read the Preface before trying to use her book.)

(3) Sermons and Spiritual Reading

We are living in an age when the liturgy is coming into its own again. The liturgical revival in Western Christendom is focusing the attention of faithful Catholics on the great treasures of prayer and devotion which are stored in the Church's own service books. This is one of the most healthy and hopeful signs of contemporary spirituality. Not only is the language of liturgical prayer dignified and worthy of its Recipient, but it has the *imprimatur* of the Church, and expresses exactly the heart and mind of the Body of Christ. Mr Ernest Oldmeadow has gathered together a number of essays on the liturgy which he wrote for the *Tablet* during the eleven years of his editorship. The result is a most charming and illuminating book—*A Layman's Christian Year* (Burns Oates and Washbourne, 7s. 6d.). The fact that the contents are journalistic in style does not detract from their spirituality. Indeed, such popular methods should attract readers who would be put off by a more academic work. From Advent to the Feast of Christ the King there are chapters which interpret in a vivid and arresting way the ancient ritual and liturgy of the Church.

Of a different purpose is another book from the same publishers —*The True Vine and its Branches*, by Dr Edward Leen (7s. 6d.). In a series of chapters (some of which have appeared in the *Clergy Review*) the author writes of the Catholic Church as an agent of reconciliation between the conflicting heresies of ultra-nationalism and internationalism. So he traces, beneath all the disorder and disease of mankind to-day, the lineaments of the Ideal Church, the Mystical Body of Christ. To the eye of faith it is that the vision is laid bare, and in the realization of the vision alone is to be found the remedy for a broken world. This is certainly a book which will repay careful thought and study.

For many years past thousands of people have looked forward to the " Bishop of London's Lent Book," and in the long series to which each year his Lordship has added an introduction are to be found the names of many leading Anglican theologians and spiritual writers. The book this year is from the pen of the Vicar of St Martin-in-the-Fields and bears the appropriate title *Starting Afresh* (Longmans, 2s. 6d.); for in the church of which " Pat " McCormick is vicar countless souls have found the inspiration for a new start. There is nothing very original in the substance of this book. The old truths which can never change are reiterated, sometimes perhaps in a new way or with some striking application to modern conditions. But through it all breathes the spirit of a passion for souls and a deep love for their Master. It is a book which attracts more by the spirit of the author than by the letter of his writings.

The Bishop of Southampton has printed some addresses given at Bishop's Hostel, Lincoln: *Christ's Treasure House* (Mowbray, 1s. 6d.). This little study of our Lord's character ought to help the laity as much as it helped the ordinands and clergy to whom it was originally addressed.

(4) Devotional Commentaries on Books of the Bible

A story is told of the late Fr Stanton that he was once asked by a pious lady what she should read in Lent. " Why not read your Bible ?" was his reply. Whatever the devout Christian may read of the great spiritual writers, both ancient and modern, no other literature can take the place of Holy Scripture in the education of the Christian mind and heart. Amongst the books sent for inclusion and notice in this survey are four which have the Bible (or some part of the Bible) for their subject.

In this connexion two recent books by Canon Peter Green deserve special mention. *The Devotional Use of the Bible* (S.P.C.K., 1s. 9d.) is intended to help arrest the fast-decaying practice of Bible-reading. Not only does the author provide an admirable scheme for Bible study, but he also describes very clearly how to use the Bible historically, devotionally and as literature. In his other book, *Our Great High Priest* (Longmans, 3s. 6d.), the author provides a kind of " running commentary " on the seventeenth chapter of St John. To it he has brought all the learning, spirituality and breadth of outlook with which his readers are familiar. To use this book as a basis for meditation is to draw forth from the familiar words old truths and new meanings.

Bishop Loyd of Nasik has followed up his study of St John with a devotional exposition of the Epistle of St James: *Doers of the Word* (Mowbray, 4s. 6d.). Here again are all the marks of the scholar and the mystic applied to one of the most practical of all the New Testament writers. In *The Psalms arranged for*

Private Worship (S.P.C.K., 5s.) Brother George, O.S.P., has provided an alternative to the Prayer Book arrangement for those who wish to use the Psalter in their private devotions. If such an alternative be desirable, this book is likely to prove as useful as any. It contains also the Little Hours and a number of collects. The introduction is very good.

(5) Other Books

Three books remain to be noticed. *The Spirit of Saint Dominic*, by Fr Humbert Clérissac, O.P. (Burns Oates and Washbourne, 6s.), is described as "a retreat for Dominicans." It is an excellent study of the genius of the Order which should interest others besides Dominicans. The author has dealt with his subject simply and directly.

The Pax House, London, has printed two delightful books by Fr W. E. Lutyens, O.G.S. *After His Likeness* (2s. 6d.) consists of addresses given at a retreat for nuns; and *Calvary* (2s.) is a collection of five dramatic poems based on the stories of the Passion.

H. L. Hubbard.

(B) FRANCE: A CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHERS

The French-speaking philosophical societies held their second congress from April 13 to 15, 1939, at Lyons. In view of the success of last year's meeting it was anticipated that there would be a large attendance this year, and in spite of the disturbing international situation this expectation was not deceived. About two hundred members assembled in the building of the Faculté des Lettres. The sincerity of the welcome accorded to the visitors and the faultlessness of the organization contributed to the friendly atmosphere which was a feature of all the sessions, which indeed is already becoming traditional in these gatherings, and which we shall no doubt find again next year at Brussels and Louvain.[1]

This year there were two main subjects, one historical—viz., the philosophy of Spinoza; and the other metaphysical—viz., the concept of the universe.

I

The papers read about Spinoza all showed how difficult it is to understand him. He is one of those writers who never completely explain themselves and whose thought is always liable to be misrepresented in any exposition of it. Is this due to its richness, or to the awkward technicality of his style? Or, again,

[1] The subject of next year's congress will be *Plato and the Idea of Value*.

is it because there are two incompatible currents in his philosophy? No doubt the difficulty is to be attributed to all these factors, and I felt this strongly as I listened to the remarkable address of M. Leroux (Rennes) on " intuitive knowledge." He considered that Spinoza's wish went beyond his logic when he said that we have an actual perception of our separate eternal essence. We shall look in vain in his system for a rational justification of this belief. There is an extraordinary conjunction in it of what is timeless with what is individual.

The problem of apprehending in God the very source of our individuality is obviously fundamental; and, in fact, nearly all the contributors to the discussion were directly concerned with the *essentia particularis affirmativa.* Thus, M. Bréhier (Paris) tried in this respect to effect a rapprochement between Plotinus and Spinoza (incidentally, he gave a masterly and moving description of the destiny and of what I may call the stoicism of the free and creative soul). M. Gagnebin (Lausanne) kept us near the same fundamental point in his discussion of the relation between inductive concepts and adequate concepts in the *Ethics*, while Mlle Barjonet (Toulouse) made use of the pluralist tendencies in Spinoza in order to discover unexpected resemblances between " the wisdom of the *Ethics* and Nietzsche's thundering voice."

At one time Spinoza was regarded as the exponent of a pantheistic unity; to-day, everyone brings out his emphasis on individuality. In any case he is fashionable, and all the speeches at the congress testified to this. Some—*e.g.*, M. Brunschvicg—in going back to their favourite philosopher, find relief from the storms which hang over Europe and from the pseudo-mysticism which menaces speculative thought in the twentieth century. Others are looking in the same direction for a more definite remedy for our troubles; for instance, M. Baudoin (Geneva) claims that the recommendation in the *Ethics* that one should become intellectually conscious of the passions in order to remove them is an anticipation of the methods of contemporary psychoanalysis and has the advantage of giving a richer metaphysical teaching.

The Christians who were present showed just as keen an interest in the subject as everyone else. In a discourse on Spinoza's semitism, M. Jean Guitton (Montpellier), in a most suggestive and profound manner, examined this Jew's vocation to singleness of mind. It was a tragic vocation; for in denying God's intervention in history, and in refusing freedom both to God and to man, was he not false to his race, to his tradition, and to the true destiny of the mind? At all events, concluded M. Guitton, he will be numbered among those to whom much will be forgiven, for they have purified much.

Canon Balthasar (Louvain) was still more indulgent. He occupied himself in baptizing Spinoza, or in trying to do so.

With all the zeal of a Spanish mystic and with characteristic Belgian goodwill he insisted at length on the spiritual value of the Spinozan climate. I confess that for my own part I have never been able to read that section of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, which offers so definite a homage to Christ, without being convinced that Spinoza felt the majesty of the gospel and was perhaps secretly attracted to the Christian faith. Does this justify us in baptizing him? We should have first to be satisfied that the radical immanence of his thought leaves room for a God to whom we can pray and who loves us, and that the fifth book of the *Ethics* really marks a break with the four others. And on these points I have less assurance than M. Balthasar. He himself acknowledged the limits of his favourable verdict: he expressly repudiated Spinoza's pantheism, and vindicated both the freedom of human action and the integrity of personality. The most that M. Balthasar can succeed in doing is to read a theistic sense into Spinoza's terms, which is what the scholastics have done for Aristotle.

There is in Spinoza's concept of energy a reality that is more empirical and more " dynamic " (as we now say) than there is in the " being " of Greek metaphysics. M. Balthasar frankly admits that it is this modernity of Spinoza that attracts him. I ask myself whether, having concluded the baptismal office, he will not have to proceed to a funeral—namely, the funeral of Aristotle! Must we give up the ordinary arguments for the existence of God from causality or contingency, and turn for preference to the arguments based on the idea of participation? It seems to me that all these categories equally need to be controlled before we can trust ourselves to them; the idea of participation, of which contemporary thinkers are again making a great deal, is one of the most fruitful, but it is also one of the most equivocal.

II

The second subject (the Universe) gave us an opportunity of investigating a whole range of different approaches. M. Berger, the energetic secretary of the Philosophical Society of the South-East, introduced the subject in socratic style by exposing our ignorance. The universe is less a distinct idea than a collection of " relative wholes " or normative ideas; moreover, it is not a phenomenal spectacle, but a mysterious ground in which we must insert our existence and fix it. At the final meeting of the congress Dr Minkowski (Marseilles) undertook the same phenomenological inquiry, and tried to distinguish the terms " world," " universe," and " cosmos," which too often are used carelessly and confusedly.

The position of M. Bachelard (Dijon) was simpler. The concept of the universe, according to him, is quite unintelligible;

its content is purely emotive and poetic; it enables us to express our sense of wonder before the unknowable. With his accustomed and stimulating combination of humour with gravity, M. Bachelard pointed out that the universe is obviously larger by night than by day !

M. Bridoux (Paris) sought, as an original disciple of Bergson, to effect a conciliation of " microscopic determinism " and " microscopic indeterminism." His analysis of chance (*hasard*) brought home to us the difficulties that are inherent in the concept of the universe as used in modern science, and that may have the effect of destroying its homogeneity and unity. He claimed that a solution of the problem might be found in the notion of a duration which is a " conductor of chances " (*pourvoyeur de hasards*), but which produces regular habits on all the cosmic levels.

The following paper by M. Souriau (Nancy)—one of the most remarkable contributed to the congress—dealt, on the other hand, with the fragility of the universe from a point of view that was, so to speak, quite interior and personal. He set out to prove this fragility by a psychological analysis of medical anæsthesia. He compared the experience to that of agony, to a journey through death. This psychological starting-point introduced a brilliant meditation on the parallel dissolution of the world and of self-consciousness. When the latter disappears, the universe also is annihilated; what exists for each of us is not *the* universe, but our own respective universes. Trans-subjective reality is not what we call the universe, but a symbolic interworld (*intermonde*). It will be realized that for M. Souriau the ego is as fragile as the universe, and that he does not believe in personal survival. Nevertheless, as M. Leroux pointed out to him, if a psychological experience of this sort could warrant any metaphysical conclusion at all, it would prove rather the possibility of survival; for the consciousness which has experienced its own extinction comes in fact triumphantly through the ordeal, since it finds itself intact when it " comes round."

It is true that anæsthesia is not the same as the experience of death; it can give us only an analogical knowledge of that. When everything has been said, death remains a great mystery. M. Souriau's analysis is applicable to its début which is tragic enough; but one may believe with Browning that the fury of the hostile voices:

> Shall dwindle, shall blend,
> Shall change, shall become first a peace out of pain,
> Then a light, then thy breast,
> O thou soul of my soul ![1]

I think, too, that the experience itself should be more exactly defined. Although I did not agree with M. Mouy (Paris) that

[1] *Prospice.*

it is inevitably a reconstruction after the event and a rationalization, I believe that it varies a great deal in different persons and in different circumstances. There are peaceful experiences of anæsthesia, in which consciousness of the world absorbs self-consciousness; others, in which the self and the world disappear at the same time without any struggle on the part of the patient; again, there are others which are terrifying and agonizing, at least for a moment or two; consciousness plumbs, as it were, an abyss, and the subject is aware of itself as existing intensely in mid-air, when it has been deprived of every support and is ready to founder in the night. M. Souriau appears to belong to this last type; at the same time his testimony showed certain oscillations in this respect.

All these discussions were extremely interesting, though more from the point of view of phenomenology than of metaphysics, and they form a happy complement on the subjective side to the observations on the spectacle of the death of others which were recently made in a little book by P. L. Landsberg, *L'Expérience de la Mort* (Paris: Desclée, de Brouwer).

Space does not allow me to do justice to several papers, notably those by MM. Segond (" Univers et liberté "), P. Mouy (" L'idée d'univers et la représentation "), and E. Dupréel (" Univers-limite et Univers-intervalle "). I would say in conclusion that apologetics cannot be indifferent to the discussion of the conceptions of the universe and of totality which are here in question; have not Christians always believed in the incompleteness of the world, and in the impossibility of finding in the concept of the universe the final unity of absolute reality ?

M. N.

(C) THEOLOGY IN CHINA

A few weeks ago the editor of Theology invited me to send some notes on developments in China of general theological interest. At the time when his letter came, for five months I had given up my normal work, teaching theology at the Canton Union College, in order to act as secretary of the emergency committee for refugees. For the past five months all the churches have been united, and have been using all their energies caring for some twenty thousand people left destitute by the invasion. Actually, at the moment when the invasion came we were just about to hold the first meeting for the new academic year of the small theological group which meets at our college. Dr Reichelt was coming to Canton to speak to us on the relation of Christianity to the other world religions. The boat on which he should have come was the first boat to be cancelled when all traffic was closed between Hong Kong and Canton. Since then there has been no opportunity for reading or teaching theology;

and if there had been, there would now be no students to teach. Our students stayed through all the time of the air-raids; with considerable courage the majority of them volunteered to stay and face the invasion, so that they might help with refugee work. Now, however, all but two or three have left. They have felt the immense pressure of the opinion, common both amongst Chinese in Hong Kong and in the central government, that nothing should be done to co-operate with the Japanese in the occupied areas. They felt that they would be called disloyal if they stayed in Canton, even to study theology; and they therefore suddenly announced that they had all decided to leave.

In such a situation the prospects are not very bright for writing of theological developments. It might be possible to write of developments in other parts of China; but unfortunately that also is not easy. Two years ago we began to discuss the possibility of federating the main Union theological colleges in Cheefoo, Nanking, West China and Canton. We hoped to work out a single system for entrance and final examination, and thus to achieve some much needed reforms in raising the general standard of theological education. Our college in Canton formed a special sub-committee to consider reforms in the curriculum and final examination. We were due to report at a joint meeting of the four colleges in Nanking last spring. By that time Nanking had fallen to the Japanese, and travel was impossible. For the moment all the work which we were undertaking has gone to pieces through the disruption of all transport and all educational work through the invasion. For the same reason there has been no opportunity to meet those who are doing theological work in different parts of the country. I myself have only had four days outside Canton since last October, and these few days were fully occupied with refugee business in Hong Kong. For four weeks we were even shut off from all mails from the outside world, and from all news except for the brief summaries in Reuter's wireless reports.

To-day things are slightly more promising. There are the beginnings of revival in the West. From West China come reports of very great educational work amongst the students who have moved to the west. There is the possibility that our own college may move west to unoccupied territory, and join forces there with other Christian colleges from Nanking or Hankow. Others recommend that we should move from Canton to Hong Kong.

But would such a course be Christian? For some the question raises no difficulty. If study is impossible under conditions of war and invasion, the obvious course is to move elsewhere and find the necessary leisure and security. For others the problem does not seem so simple. Theology is in essence the hearing and learning of the Word of God, who is Lord and Father of all

nations. If our theology became so closely wedded to a nationalism that it could not exist in the territory occupied by one nation, but had to move away to the territory occupied by another nation, would it be any longer theology, the Word from God, which we should then study? Christian theology is the Word made flesh in Christ to save the world from sin. If it is true to its purpose, it is precisely amid the strain and tension of the sin of man that theology should find a hearing. If we moved away from a position of greater difficulty to a position of greater security and ease, should we move closer to or further from the real hearing of the message of God in Christ? As I seek to decide what is the right course for our own college to pursue, I find that these questions take also a more personal form. I find that a deep cleavage is created in my own mind. At times I long again with an ardent longing for the peace and leisure of the years I spent in Oxford. At times I long to escape from the work of administration and organization, which I have been doing for refugees for the last few months. I feel that it is not the work for which I am really trained; I long to get back to my books, to thought and study, to writing and teaching. Yet I come through such times with a more urgent question in my mind. Has our theology any real answer to the invasion of one power by another, and to all the breakdown and suffering and destitution which it has caused? Would theology remain theology, the Word of God unto salvation unto them that believe, if it attempted to escape and to live in detachment from these needs? Is it not precisely in the midst of the suffering of the world that we must hear the Word of God, if it is really the God made known in Christ whom we desire to hear? As I ask these deeper questions, though I have had little if any time for reading amid the pressure of refugee organization, I have had no scarcity of incentive for thought.

This leads to my final comment. From one point of view I felt that the editor had asked an impossible question when he asked for some notes on theological developments in China. At present there is no theological development in China. Yet from another and deeper point of view the reverse of this is the truth. There is intense and surging theological development in China. Moreover, the questions which we are being driven to ask with ever new intensity are precisely the same questions which already threaten Europe almost as strongly as they do the East. The heart of this question is the precise place of limited human loyalties to limited human groups beneath the one universal and eternal loyalty to God in Christ. Does God intend the world to be divided into competing human groups, which we call nations? Does He teach us the meaning of love and sacrifice by allowing our allegiance to be given to one group of men with whom we are bound by special loyalties? Certainly in China

there was room for a far deeper self-giving of the individual to the service of the community. Should we therefore as Christians support the nationalism of the nation to which we belong, or to which we are bound by special ties of sympathy in missionary work? Is it our task in common justice to defend the weaker nation against aggression? Are Great Britain and America guilty before God because they give only sympathy to the neighbour nation in its need, and refuse to be called out into sacrificial action for the sake of international justice?

Or is there another view? Is it precisely not the task of man on earth to wield the sword of the justice of God? Is the voice we like to call justice all too often more properly called vindictiveness against the enemy? Is it precisely the sin of the world that enmity breeds enmity in an eternal vicious circle of war? Does all such vindictiveness disappear when we abandon our own all too human claims to wield the sword of justice, and hear instead the word, "Vengeance is mine, I will recompense, saith the Lord"? Did Christ perhaps really mean what He said when He taught, "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you"? Has the Church therefore betrayed its own essential allegiance when, preaching a Christian nationalism, it is left with a nationalism that is very far from Christian? Is it precisely the task of the Church to keep alive the ways of peace and reconciliation in a day when national feeling runs so high that any word of fellowship or compromise with the enemy is at once condemned as treachery? Is the Church a fellowship strictly supranational because of its loyalty to a God who is beyond all nations and Lover of them all? Is it the task of the Church, therefore, to become detached from the conflicting claims of competing nations; to gather from all nations a united community who tread the ways of service, while the nations tread the ways of war? And most challenging of all, if we can dimly see that somewhere here there is the higher vision, when we work in another country which has been invaded, could we and should we keep that vision if it was our own country which became involved in war? There is truth amid all these questions, and full weight must be given to every side. In finding the answer to them theological development must take place.

GEOFFREY ALLEN.

BOOK REVIEWS

ST PAUL AND THE CHURCH OF THE GENTILES. By Wilfred L. Knox. Cambridge University Press. 15s.

Let it be said at once that Canon Knox's new book is not only a worthy counterpart to his earlier volume *St Paul and the Church of Jerusalem*, but one of the most important of the books on the first age of Christianity which have appeared in recent years. The author takes his place in the front rank of contemporary New Testament scholars. The book is based upon profound and prolonged study both of the Pauline letters themselves and of the literatures, Jewish and Gentile—particularly the Jewish Hellenistic literature—which so often provide clues to St Paul's meaning. Philo, for example, is known to Canon Knox not only in select passages, but in bulk and as a whole. This in itself is a very valuable and not a very usual equipment.

The book may be regarded from two distinct points of view: First, it is an interpretation of the development of St Paul's theology; and, secondly, it is a study in the contemporary world of thought to which unquestionably Paul was in some considerable measure indebted. Those who, like the present reviewer, do not find Canon Knox's view of the development of St Paul's teaching entirely convincing, will not be the less anxious to pay their tribute to the erudition and the insight which the book reveals. The work is one to which readers are likely to return and return again, for it is a very storehouse of learning, and the admirable indices will serve to point the way to valuable discussion of many an obscurity.

Chapter I, "The Failure of Eschatology," contains the theme of the whole in embryo. It may be summarized as follows: Paul, the preacher of a Gospel received and accepted in terms of Jewish apocalyptic, encountered for the first time at Athens Stoic and Epicurean philosophers. The encounter was a challenge to Paul's apocalyptic thinking. The Epicureans indeed were not a serious factor in the situation, for though they would feel no reluctance to share the belief that the material world was doomed to dissolution, since to them the world was simply the chance outcome of the meeting of atoms in motion, yet their refusal to entertain the notion of a divine and providential ordering of the universe left no common ground between themselves and Paul. It was otherwise with Stoics. To them Paul could adduce, and according to Acts did adduce, certain philosophical commonplaces which appeared to lay a basis for Christian theistic faith. But when Paul tried to convert his hearers to a belief that the world process would be brought to an end by a divine assize in which "a man who had risen from the dead within the last few years" would be the judge, "the Areopagus

only laughed, and Paul was faced with the necessity of reconstructing the Gospel, if he was to appeal to the intellect of the Gentile world."

Having thus set the stage, Canon Knox proceeds in two long and very important chapters to fill in the obscure background of the thought of the Synagogue as it had taken shape under Hellenistic influences in the period before the rise of Christianity. Hellenistic Judaism, he finds, had long learnt to adapt itself to the difficulties which Paul first faced at Athens. This type of Judaism did not look forward to an approaching end, but backward to a revelation in the past—a revelation which began with creation and ended with the giving of the Law on Sinai. Judaism thus conceived could readily be transposed into Hellenistic modes of thought. It is impossible here to summarize the contents of these chapters, but attention should be directed to the interesting thesis which Canon Knox develops in Chapter III that the quasi-personified Wisdom of the Old Testament and Apocryphal Wisdom literature originated as a kind of Jewish alternative to the alluring figure of the cosmopolitan goddess Isis.

With Chapter IV we return to St Paul, and Canon Knox now follows out in detail the transformation of the Gospel under Hellenistic influences. He does not share the doubts which have recently become fashionable as to the possibility of tracing development of any kind in Paul's thought, and for my own part I find it hard to imagine how anyone could read Canon Knox's persuasive chapter on Colossians (Chapter VII, " Heresy and Orthodoxy ") without yielding to his contention that the Christological doctrine of that epistle has grown out of the new peril which Paul was called upon to face. The last paragraph of this chapter deserves to be quoted at length, for it is an admirable illustration of Canon Knox's skill in interpreting the movement of thought; at the same time the quotation will serve the further purpose of providing me with a text from which to expound the reservation which I find it necessary to make with regard to Canon Knox's reading of St Paul.

" The danger," writes Canon Knox, " which Paul was called to meet [at Colossæ] was one which threatened the whole structure of Christianity, for it involved the replacement of Jesus by personifications of the powers or names of God, identified with or set above the lords of the planets, as man's only hope of escaping from the fate to which astrology condemned him. The system would have resulted in the conflation of Christianity with its heathen and Jewish competitors in a form which substituted the knowledge of such secrets . . . for the Gospel of the love of God and man achieved by personal union with the historical Jesus accepted as the risen Lord of the Church. In meeting the danger Paul had been compelled to make a profound and far-reaching change in his method of presenting the Gospel. In his

earlier letters he had substituted cosmogony for apocalyptic as a means of converting the Gentile world. The change meant nothing to him, for he was not concerned with philosophy, and any system of thought and language that expressed the position of Jesus as the Lord was equally acceptable. But the effect of the Colossian controversy, whether Paul realized it or not, was to substitute philosophy for homiletic as the basis of Christian preaching. The divine Wisdom, the pattern and agent of creation and the divine Mind permeating the cosmos, was identified with Jesus, not as a method of midrashic exposition which could be used and thrown aside, but as an eternal truth in the realm of metaphysics; for only so could the supremacy of Jesus be asserted as against such potent beings as the rulers of the stars in their courses. It is probable that Paul was entirely unaware that his letter would produce this effect: whether he realized it or not, he had committed the Church to the theology of Nicæa " (pp. 177 *ff.*).

This paragraph may be said to contain in a concentrated form Canon Knox's central theme, and in three fundamental respects the argument appears to me to be entirely sound: (i) It sets in the centre the figure of the historical Jesus accepted as the Head of the Church, the embodiment of the Gospel of the love of God; (ii) it brings out the truth that as this Gospel moved out into the world it encountered a new environment and therewith perils of a character unknown at the outset; (iii) it expounds St Paul's doctrine as a necessary preservative against a concrete peril. Thus far I agree unreservedly. But I cannot agree with Canon Knox in supposing that St Paul deliberately substituted one set of ideas for another set—not apparently because he thought the new truer than the old, but because he found the new more effective for the purpose of evangelization. The implications of this suggestion seem to me far more serious than Canon Knox has allowed for in what he has written. If it be true that Paul " substituted cosmogony for apocalyptic," it is surely inconceivable that " the change meant nothing to him." No doubt Paul was not what we should call a philosopher, but I would submit that we do him far less than justice unless we assume that he thought hard in the terms which imposed themselves upon his mind. If his teaching developed, his mind developed too.

I question whether the change from the earlier to the later phase was ever so self-conscious or so complete as Canon Knox seems to suggest, and I am very sceptical whether the experience at Athens was the turning-point which Canon Knox supposes it to have been. It is to be remembered that the visit to Athens antedates all the extant Epistles, and that we have no direct evidence of Paul's teaching before that date. That earlier teaching can scarcely have been more apocalyptic than the Thessalonian Epistles and 1 Corinthians. And did St Paul ever cease

to think apocalyptically? Canon Knox accepts the view—and he is in very good company in so doing—that in 2 Corinthians Paul goes over deliberately to a Hellenistic doctrine of immortality which in principle dispenses with the thought of the Parousia. He does not, however, notice that other scholars—Lietzmann among them—give an entirely different interpretation of 2 Cor. v which leaves that passage still conditioned by the expectation of the return of Christ. This latter interpretation seems to me exegetically preferable. Moreover, it seems relevant to recall that though Stoics still mocked, eschatological beliefs retained a firm place in the mind of the Gentile Church of the second century—witness Justin Martyr and other Greek apologists. Then, again, in writing of the Spirit, Canon Knox attributes to St Paul a more "Hellenized" version of the concept than I think the texts warrant. Does St Paul ever conceive of the Spirit as "animating the world in general with a divine life"? (p. 119).

These are doubts which Canon Knox's book has raised in the mind of one of his readers. It only now remains to add that even if these doubts are well-founded they do not invalidate the judgment which has been already expressed that Canon Knox has made a contribution of outstanding importance to the study of early Christianity and of its environment in the Græco-Roman world.

J. M. Creed.

Saint Augustine on Eternal Life. By D. J. Leahy. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 5s.

Father Leahy's little book—oddly misdescribed on the cover as "a study of St Augustine's famous treatise on the *Vision of God in Heaven*"—aims at characterizing the saint's teaching on the life to come in terms of orthodox Catholic doctrine. A first chapter compares the Beatific Vision as Augustine conceived it with the Neoplatonic ideal of contemplation. A second attempts to show that Augustine, like St Thomas, defined the vision as function of man's intellectual nature, supernaturally perfected, and carrying with it the perfection of love. A third considers his teaching about the resurrection body and its relation to a vision which must be understood as spiritual.

The author rightly marks as the chief difference between the ideal of Augustine and that of Plotinus the fact that the Neoplatonist's goal is a subjective condition, the Christian's a personal relationship; and this explains and justifies the otherwise paradoxical denial that Plotinus gives any place for love towards God. He fails to recognize that Plotinus is concerned almost entirely with an experience to be sought here and now, while Augustine came to regard the vision (with rare exceptions) as the heavenly

reward to which the life of faith looks forward. And it is difficult to follow him in his assertion that Augustine maintains in substance, as Plotinus does not, the Thomist distinction of nature and supernature. It is certain that St Thomas was correcting Augustine on a fundamental point of philosophy, and not drawing out what was implicit in the Augustinian doctrine of grace. It is certain also that Augustine in his maturity meant by the " fruition " of God something much more than a *prise intellectuelle*. The great sentence of the *De Civitate—Vacabimus, et videbimus; videbimus, et amabimus; amabimus, et laudabimus*—is a *crescendo*, not, as Fr Leahy makes it, a *diminuendo*. Not in the vision, nor even in the love made perfect by it, but in the praise to which vision and love compel, does God become all in all.

The book contains, for its length, too many inaccuracies, especially in translation. Augustine is quoted (p. 30) as saying that " faith is the reward of the intellect "! And there are other mistakes (or misprints ?) on pp. 32, 50, 74, 103. It was not a " Neoplatonic argument " (p. 4) that man must indulge in a universal doubt; and it was Porphyry, not Plotinus (p. 36), to whom Augustine appealed as admitting by implication the necessity of grace. It is not easy to attach any meaning to the remark (p. 60) that " all that the notion of joy adds to the act of love is a statement that man's love is altruistic and that he holds the goal of his desires within his grasp." And though Fr Leahy is certainly right in refusing to allow that the famous " vision " at Ostia is evidence that Augustine (once clear of his first Neoplatonist illusions) believed the vision of God to be attainable by the ordinary Christian in this life, his own interpretation of the vision, as an extraordinary " consolation " vouchsafed to Monica, does violence to the text of the *Confessions*.

J. Burnaby.

The Ferrar Papers. Edited by B. Blackstone. Cambridge University Press. 21s.

For those who have already fallen under the spell of Little Gidding, Dr Blackstone has provided a feast of good things. Those who have so far escaped may be advised, first of all, to read Mr A. L. Maycock's admirable Life of Nicholas Ferrar (published last year). Then, if they have no desire to read as many as possible of the original documents upon which all the books about Little Gidding are based, they are more to be pitied than blamed.

The autograph (or autographs) of John Ferrar's Life of Nicholas is missing, and there are considerable variations in the oldest surviving versions of the original. Dr Blackstone publishes here a critical collation of these versions, which will be indispensable to all future students, and which enables the general reader to come as near to what John Ferrar actually wrote as is ever likely

to be possible. The original spelling and punctuation of the documents is reproduced throughout.

Next comes an unpublished Dialogue which makes an important addition to those that have been already published by Miss E. Cruwys Sharland in *The Story Books of Little Gidding* (1899). Dr Blackstone has entitled this Dialogue " The Winding Sheet," from its main theme, but it was part of the charm of the conversations in the Little Academy that they were by no means tied to a single theme, and this one is characterized by unexpected excursions which illustrate the erudition and urbanity as well as the piety of those who took part.

The third and shortest section of the book contains a collection of " Short Moral Histories," from the Peck MS in the Library of Clare College. Of these the editor justly observes that " they have a finish and a perfection of phrasing quite distinct from the rather rambling style of the more ambitious works. If on first reading they appear naive and simple, it is the deceptive simplicity of art; nowhere shall we find purer examples of the seventeenth-century colloquial manner."

Finally we are given a delightful selection of the family letters from the mass of papers in the Library of Magdalene College, which have only recently been explored. It is these letters that have brought to light the skeleton in the Little Gidding cupboard —Bathsheba, John Ferrar's wife. On one occasion, for instance, when she had been causing trouble, John wrote of her to Nicholas: " It soe much perplexes me that I Can not advise any thinge it is Most vntrew that she is ill Since she Came to Gidding for she booth eates her meat well and Sleepes as well as ever she did I blesse me at Such impudency." Here was a problem that defeated even Nicholas. " The insight into character and psychological skill so often claimed for Nicholas in the *Life* do not show up very clearly in this affair."

Nevertheless, the more that is known of Nicholas, the greater does his stature seem. It is no wonder that, during one of his absences from Gidding, John wrote to him on behalf of the rest of the family that we " now find our selves as those men did in grene Land at best but to see the moune and to liue in twie light."

A. R. V.

Rehabilitations and Other Essays. By C. S. Lewis. Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d.

The " rehabilitations " which give Mr Lewis's book its title are vindications of Shelley and Morris. It is a pity that certain essays of Mr Eliot, in which the achievements of Shelley and Dryden are brought into contrast, should have served Mr Lewis as the battleground for his fight for the reputation of Shelley. Mr Eliot's comparisons were made some considerable time

ago, and it is possible that he would not wish to stress now the points which he emphasized then. The juxtaposition of writers so essentially dissimilar as Dryden and Shelley, which may be permissible in one context, is hardly illuminating in another; and the reputation of Shelley will gain little at the expense of Dryden.

Having said so much in dispraise of Mr Lewis's method, we hasten to point out the striking merits of his results. The comparisons of Dryden and Shelley, of their powers of versification and reasoning, can largely be ignored; what is left is a sympathetic essay on Shelley which should send many back to a poet they may not have read since their 'teens, and a penetrating exposition of the flaws in Dryden's verse which makes its enjoyment still impossible for the common reader. Mr Lewis emphasizes the fallacy of taking the Augustan poets, and especially Dryden, at their own valuation as " classical " writers. " Their merits are great, but neither their merits nor their limitations are those of ancient literature or of that modern literature which is truly classical." Dryden's faults are the faults of a non-classical poet. He has little feeling for decorum. He is prepared at any moment to sacrifice the total effect of a poem to " every ray of accidental beauty " which may gleam across his path; to intrude the comic or even the vulgar into the midst of the sublime. In the longer poems it is the incidental felicities of description and characterization which we enjoy. In structure and development Dryden is frequently weak and unconvincing.

Mr Lewis's conclusion in praise of Shelley is the best part of his essay. It was time that someone undertook this task, and here it has been done as well as it could be. Mr Lewis sets out to show that " Shelley, with all his faults of execution, is a poet who must rank higher than Dryden with any critic who claims to be classical; that he is superior to Dryden by the greatness of his subjects and his moral elevation (which are merits by classical standards), and also by the unity of his actions, his architectonic power, and his general observance of *decorum* in the Renaissance sense of the word; that is, his disciplined production, not just of poetry, but of the poetry in each case proper to the theme and the species of composition." This is *apologia* in the grand style ! If we are careful still to take the Shelley-Dryden antithesis with a grain of salt, we shall find Mr Lewis's exposition of Shelley's greatness one of the most stimulating, and convincing, pieces of appreciative criticism which have appeared of recent years.

His praise of Morris is less successful. There is a peculiar thinness, an emotional tenuity, about this essay which contrasts with the full-blooded enthusiasm of the former. The dearth of quotation may in part explain it. Most people remember something of Shelley, but to many the poetry of Morris is quite

unknown; and in such a case it is essential to provide copious illustration of what one is talking about. Mr Lewis sees Morris as a poet of theological relevance. " The modern literary world is increasingly divided into two camps, that of the positive and militant Christians and that of the convinced materialists. It is here that Morris may be of incalculable value in saving us from ' dissociation,' for both camps can find in him something that they need. The appeal of this pagan poet to the Christian reader is obvious. No one else states quite so clearly that dilemma in the natural virtues and the natural desires from which all philosophical religion must start—the question which all theologies claim to answer." This is well said; and in his final essay on " Christianity and Literature " Mr Lewis amplifies certain of the considerations which give this essay an interest which it cannot claim as a " rehabilitation " of Morris. The volume contains six further essays of a more academic nature.

BERNARD BLACKSTONE.

HANDBOOK OF CHRISTIAN TEACHING. For use with agreed syllabuses. The Sheldon Press. 4s. 6d.

With the decline of Church elementary schools greater emphasis has been laid upon the paramount importance of securing efficient religious instruction in all state-aided schools. For the past twenty years local education authorities, Anglicans and Free Churchmen have been sympathetically co-operating in the task of compiling syllabuses of religious teaching for use in provided schools, and so admirable are certain of these syllabuses, and the need of co-ordinating the religious instruction in the various grades of schools so urgent, that increasingly agreed syllabuses are being used in non-provided schools also. Yet it is acknowledged by all competent to judge that, valuable as a syllabus may be, it is the faith and knowledge of the teacher that are essential, and an excellent syllabus in the hands of an inadequately instructed teacher must fail in its purpose.

The *Handbook of Christian Teaching* aims at providing succinctly and accurately just that kind of knowledge a teacher needs who is desirous of imparting religious instruction sincerely and intelligently. It is for use with agreed syllabuses, and so important is the *Handbook* that it is strongly commended by the Archbishop of Canterbury and Dr J. Scott Lidgett. Many scholars have collaborated in its production, and such names as Dr Goudge and Dr Guillaume are a sufficient guarantee to Anglicans of the soundness of its teaching, and Free Churchmen on the Editorial Committee include such well-known teachers as Dr T. H. Robinson and Dr Basil Yeaxlee. The *Handbook* is based upon *The Oxford Handbook of Religious Knowledge*, published in 1933, and a great part of the actual writing has been done by the Rev. T.

Grigg-Smith, whose labours on behalf of religious education have been considerable.

The contents of the *Handbook* are arranged for teachers of scholars of eleven years and upwards, and cover practically the whole of the Bible, together with the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds and the Christian Duties. But the sections are graded, and thus adapted to the ages and needs of the scholars. The purpose of the various sections is to provide exact knowledge and background—in fact, just what so many well-intentioned teachers do not possess. For instance, Section I is entitled "Subjects of Special Interest or Difficulty"; here we have valuable notes on the meaning of the word "Bible," the name Jehovah, Dreams and Visions, Miracles, etc. The New Testament is arranged for four grades, and just sufficient information is provided by way of introduction to the Gospels, Epistles and the Revelation of St John so that the teaching is set in its appropriate environment.

One of the outstanding merits of the *Handbook* is the way it faces difficulties but stands firm by orthodoxy. There are, for instance, useful notes on the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection, and references are made to the Report on Doctrine in the Church of England.

It must not be supposed that the devotional aspect of religious teaching is in any way subordinated to formal instruction. Emphasis is laid upon prayer and worship, and the sacraments of baptism and holy communion are also expounded.

In this review we have been able to touch only very briefly upon some of the important sections of the *Handbook*. We strongly commend it to the clergy, who will find in it much useful material for sermons and addresses. It should be used in all training colleges — both provided and non-provided. Chaplains and lecturers in divinity in these colleges could not do better than base much of their instruction upon it. Teachers in secondary, as well as in elementary, schools should study it carefully, preferably in groups or under the guidance of a leader, since the matter it contains requires and deserves close attention. It is a marvel of cheapness, and we congratulate Dr Lowther Clarke upon its production. We regard this *Handbook* as marking an epoch in the development of religious education in the schools of this land.

W. J. Brown.

The Fathers. By Allen Tate. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 7s. 6d.

This first novel by one of the American collaborators of Theology is only too likely to be overlooked. In the United States Mr Tate is a leading contemporary poet and also—notwithstanding that his clear-sighted and classical approach to

writing is hardly intelligible to his compatriots—he enjoys a reputation as a critic; but he remains practically unknown in this country, and to us the unknown is apt to be suspect *per se*. Furthermore, *The Fathers*—the first of his books to be set up and printed here—is not a good novel. It admittedly has one feature which will attract unless it altogether repels us. The inhabitants of the United States are still divided into Northerners and Southerners, and none the less so that the division is chiefly apparent to the latter. Mr Tate is a Southerner, and as such has devised a tale about Southern modes of feeling and acting. The scene he has laid on the banks of the noble Potomac River, mainly in Virginia, but partly on the other side in the District of Columbia, and also he has chosen—needlessly—to have the essential events which he narrates coincide with the preliminaries and early stages of the Civil War—a struggle hallowed in Southern memory. In American fiction the evocation of that war has become hackneyed, but for us in England to-day, on the contrary, the whole setting and atmosphere may have the fascination of the unfamiliar. On top of that, Mr Tate proves himself a gifted storyteller. He writes with great care. He displays a remarkable power of exciting suspense. He can charge detail with significance, and on making this detail accurate and possessed of verisimilitude he has evidently lavished immense pains. He seems to be able instinctively to convey the mystery and strangeness of human relations, the isolation of the individual in the midst of his own kind, the propensity of souls to miss one another precisely when in quest of one another. Yet these gifts turn out to be employed to little purpose. It may be recalled that Mr Percy Lubbock once indicated very well how Thackeray's skill in preparing and leading up to a big scene goes hand in hand with a failure to make the most of a big scene once it is reached. Mr Tate allies a same strength with a same weakness. The narration of the great moments of his story leaves the reader, who has been so admirably keyed up to them, feeling oddly frustrated. This defect involves another. When the book has been closed, the reader is far from clear that the story has a purport, and the doubts which then assail him are not dissipated either by consulting the advertisement on the dust-cover—superior as that is to what is usually found in such a place—or by turning back to certain explanatory passages—notably on pp. 185-6, 217-20—in the course of the narrative. Mr Tate does not give unmistakable evidence of having made up his mind about the Virginian ideal of a gentleman or about the rival claims of individuality and membership of a group. The waywardness of the hero—the centre of the story—is never explained nor its motive disclosed. Yet the very vagueness of the drama, added to the presence of the would-be elucidatory passages to which I have just alluded, shows *The Fathers* to have

been inspired by a high seriousness, and whosoever will hold the Catholic faith can, I fancy, find it more stimulating than a hundred current productions by novelists fully perspicuous and neat.

MONTGOMERY BELGION.

THE MEDIEVAL CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL THOUGHT: THOMAS AQUINAS, MARSILIUS OF PADUA, RICHARD HOOKER. By Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves. Oxford University Press. 8s. 6d.

This brief and brilliant work contains six lectures delivered in the University of Oxford in the summer term of 1938 by Dr A. P. d'Entrèves, Professor of Philosophy of Law in the University of Paris.

To Professor d'Entrèves the history of political theory is first and foremost the history of man's attempts to solve the problem of political obligation. The Christian approach to this problem was, and is, radically different from that of the Classical philosophers. Romans xiii, 1-6—and, as Professor d'Entrèves observes, " the whole history of Christian political theory can well be said to be nothing else than an uninterrupted commentary upon this text "—implies that political values can no longer be conceived or represented as a purely human concern. " Obedience has ceased to be a merely political problem; authority has assumed a sacred character." It is true that from those basic assumptions it was possible to draw sharply contrasted inferences. It is true also that the theological premise did not preclude the right of rational inquiry: the problem of politics was not left exclusively upon the plane of religious obligation. " Mediæval thought endeavoured to construct a theory of politics not only upon a religious, but upon a philosophical and legal basis."

Fundamental, therefore, to this investigation is the concept of natural law as the ultimate source of all legal values, the recognition of a legal order superior to the state, of the priority of law as the embodiment of justice. This was the traditional medieval view, and it may be examined, for example, in the writings of Aquinas. It came to be challenged by the rival doctrine that the state is itself the embodiment of justice and thus the source of law. This new and revolutionary doctrine, which may be said to have been introduced by Marsilius of Padua, necessarily implies a degradation of religion to a mere *instrumentum regni*. It was the task of Richard Hooker, the third of the three great thinkers particularly considered in this study, to gather up the threads of traditional speculation and to restore the theory of law and government to its proper basis. " Hooker's theory of the relation of human law to natural law is that of

Aquinas." But within the limits of natural and divine law he makes the strongest possible assertion of the full and complete power of the human legislator. The laws of ecclesiastical—and *a fortiori* of civil—polity are removed from the control of a rigid appeal to Scripture and are conceived in terms of historical convenience and development. It is true that Hooker deliberately restricts the field of his inquiry to his own country: but it is profoundly untrue that his discussion of the problems of political theory can be dismissed as " insular."

There is infinitely more in this condensed and closely reasoned introduction to the study of medieval political thought which the specialist will find illuminating and corrective. But the outstanding value of these lectures lies in the lecturer's professional preoccupation with legal philosophy and, in particular, with the medieval treatment of the concept of natural law, and in his clear perception that his subject-matter is still intensely topical. The doctrine of the independence of law as against the state, and the doctrine that the state is itself the source and the criterion of law, are to this day in eager and embittered conflict. " And we are left to wonder which of the two opposing views, still openly defying each other, will in the end prevail."

CHARLES SMYTH.

HOW TO READ THE BIBLE ALOUD. By R. S. T. Haslehurst. S.P.C.K. 4s.

This book, emanating from so great a liturgical centre as Chichester Cathedral, deserves the attention of all who have to read the lessons in church, whether laymen, theological students, or—dare we add ?—experienced parish priests. It is written with knowledge, understanding, and humour—four common methods of reading are characterized as the La-di-da, the Harbour Bar, the Hound of the Baskervilles, and the Threshing Machine ! There are two valuable chapters on snags for the unwary in the Gospels and Epistles, and there is a very useful—and, better still, unpedantic—list of proper names with their pronunciation. One cannot, however, help regretting that more emphasis is not laid upon the fact that the reading of the Bible in church is primarily liturgical; the lessons form part of an act of worship, addressed by Christ through His mystical body, the Church, to the glory of God the Father. A greater awareness of this fact would lend point to much that the author has to say and would ward off many of those frequent errors which he is concerned to prevent. With this qualification the book is to be thoroughly recommended.

E. L. MASCALL.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: D. E. Trueblood, *The Trustworthiness of Religious Experience* (1s. 6d.).

BLOUD ET GAY, PARIS: P. Chaillet, *L'Eglise est Une*; Hommage à Moehler (75 fr.).

BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE: L. Carreras, *The Glory of Martyred Spain* (6s.); *The Old Testament*, Cambridge Summer School Lectures (7s. 6d.); E. Burrows, S.J., *The Oracles of Jacob and Balaam* (12s. 6d.); D. Attwater, *Names and Name-Days* (5s.), *A Dictionary of the Popes* (10s. 6d.); B. Jarrett, *The Religious Life* (5s.); M. Bendiscioli, *The New Racial Paganism* (3s. 6d.).

CHURCH LITERATURE ASSOCIATION: E. L. Mascall, *The Christian and the Next War* (2d.); D. G. Peck, *An Outline of Christian Social Doctrine* (6d.); A. Beale, *Totalitarianism and Christianity* (2d.).

T. AND T. CLARK: R. Bell, *The Qur'an*, Vol II (12s. 6d.).

JAMES CLARKE: B. C. Plowright, *Our Gospel or His?* (3s. 6d.).

C. W. DANIEL: M. Fraenkel, *Death is Not Enough* (7s. 6d.).

DESCLÉE, DE BROUWER ET CIE, PARIS AND BRUGES: P. Galtier, S.J., *Le Sacré-Cœur* (textes pontificaux); B. H. Merkelbach, O.P., *Mariologia* (45 fr.).

EPWORTH PRESS: J. E. Wilkinson (Ed.), *Richard Baxter's "The Reformed Pastor"* (7s. 6d.).

FABER AND FABER: James Joyce, *Finnagan's Wake* (25s.).

INDUSTRIAL CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP: *The Social Significance of Worship* (4d.); *The Industrial Christian Fellowship: On what does it Stand?* A reply to Sir Charles Marston (2d.).

J. AND C. INNES: *Church Service Society Annual* (3s.).

INTER-VARSITY FELLOWSHIP: J. C. M. Conn, *The Menace of the New Psychology* (1s.); H. E. Guillebaud, *United Bible Study* (1s.).

METHUEN: R. Fyleman, *A Book of Saints* (3s. 6d.); E. Graham Howe and L. Le Mesurier, *The Open Way: A Study in Acceptance* (8s. 6d.).

NISBET: B. A. Yeaxlee, *Religion and the Growing Mind* (7s. 6d.).

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: E. C. Dewick, *The Indwelling God* (10s. 6d.); N. Söderblom, *The Living God* (5s., Cheap Edition).

PITMAN: W. Blackshaw, *The Community and Social Service* (7s. 6d.).

SEABURY-WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY: N. C. Powell, *The Post-Ordination Training of the Clergy* (25c.).

SHELDON PRESS: H. P. Cooke, *Charles I and his Earlier Parliaments* (7s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: *Youth's Job in the Parish* (6d.); J. P. Whitney, *Reformation Essays* (8s. 6d.); Bp R. Stephens, *Sermons for Lay Readers* (3s. 6d.); H. S. Box, *An Introduction to the Ignatian Exercises* (3s. 6d.); P. Green, *The Devotional Use of the Bible*, 1s. 9d.; H. R. Wilson, *An Anglican in Estonia* (2s.); F. Schofield, *The Rudiments of Prayer* (2s. 6d.); P. J. Thompson, *The Inspiration and Inerrancy of the Bible* (1s.); H. I'B. Smith, *Anglican Weddings* (1s.); T. W. Crafer, *The Healing Miracles in the Book of Acts* (1s.); N. Zernov, *The Monk who Rebuilt Russia: St Sergius of Radonezh* (5s.); A. E. Henderson, *Some Yorkshire Abbeys: Then and Now* (6s.); H. C. Warner (Ed.), *Youth in Action* (3s. 6d.); A. W. F. Blunt, *The Teaching of the New Testament* (1s. 9d.); W. and H. Kendrick, *The New Testament for the Children—I* (10d.); W. W. S. March, *Festival Days: Children's Services* (1s.); G. W. Skeat, *Teaching of the Creed* (1s.); R. W. Jackson, *Jonathan Swift: Dean and Pastor* (6s.); Bishop of Burnley (Ed.), *Bishop Seaton of Waterfield* (5s.); C. F. Rogers, *The Fear of Hell* (3s. 6d.); A. Lukyn Williams, *The Doctrines of Modern Judaism Considered* (5s.); H. Chalmer Bell, *Catholics and the Group Movement* (2s.); J. E. Hunt, *Merbecke's Book of Common Prayer Noted* (7s. 6d.); *The Orthodox Liturgy* (2s. 6d.); S. M. Morgan, *Music in Village Churches* (2s.); F. Wheeler, *The Priest and his Prayer* (3s. 6d.).

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS: G. R. Elliott, *Humanism and Imagination* (11s. 6d.).

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